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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
LINDA SUGIN: Good afternoon, everybody. I am Linda Sugin, the 
Associate Dean of Fordham Law School, and it is my great pleasure to 
welcome you all here. Fordham is very honored and excited to be hosting 
such a fantastic group of international tax thinkers, and I am really excited 
for today’s program. 
For those of you who do not know me, I have been in the tax academy 
for a long time. I have taught tax here for twenty-five years, and I cannot 
think of another time in my career when so much change seemed to be 
happening so quickly. I think all of today’s speakers will agree that we 
are seeing a regime change now in international tax—for better or for 
worse, or maybe for better and for worse. I look forward to this afternoon 
so that we can think more clearly about what will be better and what will 
be worse. 
Reform of the international tax provisions may have been a long time 
coming, but that does not mean that we were prepared to deal with it and 
the aftermath when it occurred. This is a new environment for all of us—
for our students, for our clients, for our country, and for our global 
economy. The effects will be far-reaching and lasting, and I look forward 
to the views of all the experts gathered here today. 
Today’s speakers come from all corners of the tax community and 
include academics, practitioners, lawyers, and economists. We have a 
full-court press to make sense of where we are going and to make sure 
that we like wherever we are heading. 
I want to acknowledge the Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law for sponsoring this conference and, in particular, the 
Editor-in-Chief; the Managing Editor; the Symposium Editor, Oliver, 
who will speak in a minute; and the Journal’s Faculty Advisor, Professor 
Caroline Gentile. They have done a great job putting this together. 
Shanelle Holley and her staff in the Office of Public Programs make the 
logistics look easy, and I want to thank them as well. 
My greatest thanks, of course, go to Professor Rebecca Kysar, who 
has been the driving force behind this conference from the beginning. It 
was her idea to do this before she even joined our faculty. Rebecca put 
together today’s incredible roster of speakers, some of whom I have been 
trying to invite to Fordham for a long time without any success, so I 
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cannot believe how lucky I am that Professor Kysar has joined our faculty. 
I am so proud to be your colleague. 
Without further ado, I want to call up Oliver Phillipson, the 
Symposium Editor of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, 
to introduce all the speakers for today. 
MR. PHILLIPSON: Hello and good afternoon. Welcome one and all 
to the 2018 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law Symposium: 
“The Future of the New International Tax Regime.” 
Our event today is divided into four parts. First, you will hear from 
our keynote speaker, Professor Rosanne Altshuler of Rutgers University. 
Then, you will hear from two panels. Professor Fadi Shaheen, Associate 
Professor of Law and Professor Charles Davenport Scholar at Rutgers 
Law School, will moderate the first panel, which is composed of leading 
academics in the field of international taxation, including Michael Graetz, 
Wilbur H. Friedman Professor of Tax Law and Columbia Alumni 
Professor of Tax Law at Columbia Law School; Rebecca Kysar, Professor 
of Law at Fordham University School of Law; Susan Morse, Angus G. 
Wynne Sr. Professor in Civil Jurisprudence at the University of Texas at 
Austin School of Law; and Daniel Shaviro, Wayne Perry Professor of 
Taxation at New York University School of Law. Professor Jeffrey 
Colon, Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law, will 
moderate the second panel, which is composed of practitioners in the 
field, including Richard Phillips, Senior Policy Analyst at the Institute on 
Taxation and Economic Policy; Danielle Rolfes, partner in KPMG’s 
Washington National Tax practice; David Rosenbloom, member at 
Caplin & Drysdale and James S. Eustice Visiting Professor of Practice 
and Taxation and Director of the International Tax Program at New York 
University School of Law; and Stephen Shay, retired partner and 
consultant at Ropes & Gray LLP and Senior Lecturer on Law at Harvard 
Law School. Professor Steven Dean of Brooklyn Law School will provide 
closing remarks. 
Please join me in welcoming our keynote speaker, Professor 
Altshuler.  
  
2019]     THE FUTURE OF THE NEW  






PROF. ALTSHULER: Thank you very much for inviting me. It is an 
honor to be here today. I keep thinking that there has been some sort of 
mistake and that I should be in the audience while one of the luminaries 
on this afternoon’s panel gives the keynote speech. 
I thought it would be fun to come up with a provocative title for my 
talk and settled on “Why I’m Guilty of Liking the Global Intangible Tax 
on Low-Taxed Income (GILTI): The Case for a Minimum Tax on Low-
Taxed Foreign Income.” I hope to stimulate a conversation on the 
minimum tax in GILTI that continues throughout the afternoon. 
Much of what I am going to say today is based on my work with 
Harry Grubert from the Office of Tax Analysis of the U.S. Treasury 
Department, who we unfortunately lost last summer. Harry introduced me 
to the idea of pairing a dividend-exemption system with a minimum tax. 
Harry and I did an in-depth paper published in The National Tax Journal 
comparing dividend exemption with a minimum tax to other systems of 
taxing international income, including the flawed—at least in my view—
system that was in place until this year.1 
 We came away from our comparison between the prior system and 
various different alternatives convinced that dividend exemption with a 
minimum tax would improve the system along many dimensions and 
dominated the other systems that we considered.2 
That was a few years ago. Now, we have a new system that has 
features similar to what Harry and I proposed and analyzed in our paper. 
The topic of my talk today essentially revolves around how we came to 
the conclusion that a territorial-type system—one that exempts some 
types of foreign-source income from home-country taxation—combined 
with a worldwide-type system—one with accrual taxation of some other 
types of foreign income—was a worthy alternative for consideration. 
Simply put, I want to explain why I like GILTI. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Fixing the System: An Analysis of 
Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671 (2013). 
 2. Id. 
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The previous system for taxing the international income of U.S. 
multinationals was worldwide with a foreign tax credit and deferral.3 As 
everyone knows, we were the only major country with this type of system 
in place before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which Congress passed in 
December 2017 and became effective in January 2018.4 
There were many problems with the previous system.5 One problem 
was profit shifting and its effect on investment distortions.6 The evidence 
on profit shifting is extensive, and the problem seemed to have been 
getting worse.7 Aggressive tax planning is more than just a revenue 
concern; aggressive tax planning distorts investment decisions by 
magnifying the benefits of low-tax locations.8 
The other problem was the lockout effect, which was attributable to 
both the actual and the implicit tax costs of repatriation. U.S. companies 
use various techniques to avoid the repatriation tax such as having the 
U.S. parent borrow using accumulated financial assets abroad as implicit 
collateral.9 All repatriation-avoidance schemes come at a cost. For 
example, the case of borrowing that I just mentioned would have a 
ballooning balance sheet to raise the company’s cost of capital. The 
repatriation tax in the prior system was extremely wasteful and it is well 
known that there was something like $2.3 trillion of “trapped” earnings 
sitting abroad.10 The repatriation tax may also have induced U.S. 
companies to acquire foreign companies in part because of the cheap 
source of locked-out capital that was available.11 In short, the lockout 
effect was a major problem. 
There is also the problem of complexity. Of course, it is an open 
question whether the new system is more complex than the old one, but 
the prior system certainly was complex, requiring extensive calculations 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id. at 675-76. 
 4. Id. at 672. 
 5. Id. at 675. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational 
Company Income Abroad: Profits, Note Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 
247, 248 (2012). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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and adjustments involving foreign tax credits, allocated expenses, and 
more.12 
In addition, there were competitiveness concerns with the prior 
system. While the prior system of credit and deferral provided many 
advantages to low-tax locations, there may have been cases where the 
potential repatriation tax and other rules in the U.S. system put some U.S. 
companies at a disadvantage and could have resulted in an allocation of 
capital that was inefficient.13 
Finally, the prior system raised very little revenue, virtually none 
from dividends.14 
I will now briefly discuss the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“The Act”).15 
The Act made major changes to the international tax system.16 It made 
enough changes to easily keep us busy for a generation and to keep many 
of us out of retirement. Right now, there is room for scholarship looking 
at the early effects of the Act and, when data becomes available, on how 
firm and government behavior changed in response to the Act. 
The Act lowered the corporate tax rate from thirty-five percent to 
twenty-one percent.17 That is a big deal and is important for all behavior 
that is distorted by the corporate tax. 
I just taught my undergraduate economics majors about the 
distortionary effects of taxes. I showed them that the deadweight loss of 
a tax rises with the square of the tax rate—when you double the tax rate, 
you quadruple the excess burden.18 The result, of course, is symmetric.19 
If you cut the tax in half, you lower the excess burden four times.20 
Therefore, the deadweight loss of the corporate tax should certainly 
decrease with this large reduction in the statutory rate. 
The new system, much like the previous system, has worldwide and 
territorial elements.21 We now have a 100 percent dividends-received 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Id. at 676. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 675. 
 15. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 43. 
 18. Rosanne Altshuler, The Case for Fundamental Tax Reform, 2012 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 399, 404 (2012). 
 19. TED GAYER & HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 332-333 (McGraw-Hill ed., 
10th ed. 2014). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2189 (2017). 
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deduction for the foreign-source portion of dividends received by a U.S. 
corporation from their own foreign corporations.22 Credits are not allowed 
for foreign taxes associated with the dividends eligible for the dividends-
received deductions.23 
We have three new provisions with fun names. The first new 
provision is called GILTI, which is an acronym for Global Intangible 
Low-Tax Income. Under this new provision, controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) income that is formulaically determined to be global 
intangible low-tax income is taxed on accrual but with a fifty percent 
deduction.24 This fifty percent deduction is scheduled to be reduced to a 
37.5 percent rate after 2025.25 With the deduction, the tax on GILTI 
income is 10.5 percent initially, and then the tax increases to 13 and 1/8 
percent after 2025.26 The new law requires familiarity with fractions. 
GILTI is a bit of a misnomer. The income the GILTI provision 
catches is not necessarily low-tax, and it is not necessarily from intangible 
assets.27 As I mentioned, a formula is applied to determine what income 
is taxed currently and what GILTI catches.28 Very loosely speaking, 
income taxed currently is the excess of a CFC’s income over ten percent 
of its adjusted basis in depreciable tangible property.29 Simply put, 
corporations can deduct a ten percent return from their active income, and 
the remainder is currently taxed and considered an excess return, a return 
to holding intangible assets.30 
It is important to note that this is an overall calculation, it is not 
calculated country by country. The ten percent return and losses are netted 
across CFCs, and the foreign tax credits of CFCs with losses are lost 
altogether.31 Also, it is crucial to note that firms do not receive full foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2190. 
 24. Id. at 2213. 
 25. Id. at 2213-14. 
 26. See H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 626-627 (2017). 
 27. Simcha David, Innocent Until Proven GILTI—Not Anymore: The New Global 
Intangible Low Taxed Income Regime, EISNER AMPER (Nov. 14, 2018) https://www. 
eisneramper.com/gilti-income-tax-ami-1118/ [https://perma.cc/2RFX-F8ZD]. 
 28. Id. at 2214. 
 29. Paul Sczudlo & Megan Lisa Jones, Bring it Home, 41 L.A. LAW. 22, 25 (2018). 
See also 26 U.S.C.A. § 951A(b)(2)(A) (West 2017). 
 30. Sczudlo & Jones, supra note 29, at 25. See also 26 U.S.C.A. § 951A(b)(2)(A) 
(West 2017). 
 31. Deborah Tarwasokono & Jose E. Murillo, GILTI or Not GILTI?, 100 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 29, 31 (2018). 
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tax credits on their GILTI income. Only eighty percent of the foreign 
taxes attributable to GILTI income are allowed and there is no carryover 
of excess credits.32 
U.S. interest, general and administrative expenses (G&A), and 
research and development (R&D) expenses are allocable against GILTI 
income. 
If you put it all together, you see that U.S. residual tax is going to be 
due on your GILTI income if the foreign tax rate is less than 13.125 
percent, which will be approximately 16.4 percent after 2025. Therefore, 
there is no residual U.S. tax if foreign taxes are at least 13 and 1/8 percent. 
The experts in this room will tell you, however, that—due to expense 
allocations being retained in the new law—you could have U.S. taxes due 
on your GILTI income even if your foreign tax exceeds twenty-one 
percent. 
Research is required to determine the extent to which the GILTI 
provisions will bite. According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, the 
provision was not a large revenue raiser.33 It is possible that very few 
multinationals will pay residual tax on GILTI income. I do not believe we 
know yet. At this point, it is clear that GILTI is a minimum tax, and that 
it adds a worldwide feature to our new territorial tax system. 
The second new provision is FDII, which stands for Foreign-Derived 
Intangible Income. FDII is a tax expenditure for foreign-derived 
intangible income and, like GILTI, is determined formulaically. It may or 
may not be compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.34 
FDII certainly does look like an export subsidy. 
Finally, there is the third new provision, BEAT—the Base Erosion 
and Anti-Abuse Tax—which is an add-on minimum tax.35 The BEAT 
applies to U.S. corporations with more than $500 million of average 
annual gross receipts and with base-eroding payments related to foreign 
persons exceeding three percent of total deductions allowed.36 This 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Barbara Rasch & Joshua Kaplan, INSIGHT: Fundamentals of Tax Reform: 
GILTI, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-fundamentals-
tax-n57982093912/ [https://perma.cc/86SR-TB69]. 
 33. Kimberly A. Clausing, Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act 2-3 (Oct. 29, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3274827 [https://perma.cc/UY2J-
Q93N]. 
 34. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International Tax 
Regime, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 339, 350-351 (2018). 
 35. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2226 (2017). 
 36. Id. at 2230. 
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provision also may not be fully compatible with WTO rules and may have 
treaty problems.37 
I want to focus on the GILTI and talk about minimum taxes that are 
designed to put a brake on the income-shifting behavior of home-country 
multinationals. I think non-international tax experts may find the 
motivation for the minimum tax puzzling and question why it was 
necessary. 
No one likes the idea of a minimum tax. One always likes to think 
that there are better ways to deal with the problems that the minimum tax 
is trying to solve. Where did the idea of a minimum tax come from? Why 
stick a worldwide feature onto a territorial system, and how is it possible 
that I might like this? 
Economists typically use three efficiency criteria to evaluate 
international tax systems: capital export, capital import, and capital 
ownership neutralities.38 These concepts, however, do not get us very far 
in any analysis. The problem is that each standard is based on very special 
assumptions for which there is very little empirical evidence. An extreme 
example is a firm that has a locational intangible, such as a fast food 
trademark that requires that the company produce locally in order to 
supply its customers. In that case, you would want to ensure that all firms 
competing in the same location face the same tax rate. You would want 
to ensure capital import or capital ownership neutrality. 
But you can have another extreme: a mobile intangible, such as the 
design of a computer chip. The chip can be produced anywhere for the 
worldwide market. In that case, you would want capital export neutrality. 
It is impossible for us to come up with standards that are going to fit all 
the cases, and tax policy cannot possibly be calibrated to have different 
rules for different cases. 
What a reform can hope to accomplish is to eliminate the 
unnecessary waste and the possibility of extremely high or low tax 
burdens that are not justified under any standard concept. If we are able 
to get rid of the extremely low or high tax burdens, then we can know we 
are moving toward an optimum without overshooting it and running the 
risk of making things worse. 
When you do an analysis of tax reform alternatives, what margins 
should you consider? Harry Grubert and I examined the lockout effect of 
the repatriation tax, changes in incentives to shift income, distortions of 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Altshuler & Grubert, supra note 1, at 674. 
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investment location incentives, changes in incentives to expatriate, and 
then a potpourri of other concerns, including revenue complexity and the 
reaction of foreign governments.39 
The question that we pondered—and that the minimum tax is 
designed to answer—is whether or not we can make improvements in all 
of these areas or whether the goals are inherently in conflict.40 Must 
eliminating the lockout of foreign earnings exacerbate incentives for 
income shifting? Can income shifting be limited without an unnecessary 
burden on productive foreign investment? It turns out that the goals are 
not inherently in conflict.41 
What reforms did we consider as worthy alternatives to the old 
system? The baseline was the prior system, the worldwide with credit and 
deferral, but with a thirty percent rate because there was consensus that 
the United States needed to lower its rate in response to the dramatic and 
continuing decline in corporate tax rates abroad.42 We considered a 
decrease in the corporate statutory rate from thirty-five to thirty percent.43 
We included the repeal of deferral as one extreme for our analysis.44 
Under this extreme option, the worldwide system in place would be 
retained and the deferral privilege for active business income would be 
repealed.45 
The other extreme was dividend exemption.46 Of course, the devil is 
in the details. We considered a system with no allocations of parent 
overhead expenses to exempt foreign income.47 We assumed that passive 
income and other income under Subpart F would continue to be subject 
to the current tax.48 Then we looked at dividend exemption with the 
Japanese effective tax rate test.49 If the effective tax rate is below the 
threshold, which was fifteen percent in our proposal, the income is 
currently includable in the U.S. taxable income base and subject to the 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See generally id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 676, 678. 
 42. Id. at 676. 
 43. Id. at 672. 
 44. Id. at 708. 
 45. Id. at 676. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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full corporate rate.50 The subsidiary’s income “could escape inclusion if 
it passed an active business income tax test.”51 If it failed the test, it is 
subject to full taxation. This version of dividend exemption takes away 
the incentive to shift income to a pure tax haven as exists with check-the-
box planning.52 
We considered dividend exemption with a per country minimum tax 
of fifteen percent, with a credit for foreign taxes up to fifteen percent.53 
“Dividends both from countries subject to the minimum tax and those 
above the minimum are fully exempt, including dividends from 
previously taxed income.”54 
We also considered a per country minimum tax with expensing.55 
“Expensing” means you get a full immediate deduction for the cost of 
investment and results in taxation of only what we call “excess” or 
“supernormal” returns to investment.56 This is the same as the treatment 
of domestic investment under the new tax law, at least for the next five 
years.57 Prior law had expensing for fifty percent of adjusted basis, and it 
would have phased out in 2020.58 
Note that, by allowing expensing, firms that are facing the most 
competition—those that are earning just normal returns—would be 
competitive in foreign locations under a minimum tax.59 U.S. firms would 
face the same rate as their competitors with headquarters in countries with 
territorial tax systems and their competitors with headquarters in the 
foreign location.60 Note that the minimum tax with expensing is similar 
to GILTI. 
We also examined dividend exemption with an overall foreign 
minimum tax.61 Here, the minimum tax is calculated on an overall basis, 
instead of country-by-country.62 “A company would be subject to a tax of 
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fifteen percent on active foreign income with a credit for the company’s 
overall effective tax rate up to the fifteen percent threshold.”63 
As with the per country minimum tax, we also examined a variant 
with expensing. This variant is similar to GILTI. Allowing a deduction of 
ten percent of adjusted basis is not the same as expensing, but if the 
normal return happens to be ten percent, you would be taxing only the 
excess return with GILTI.64 I can only guess that this was the idea behind 
the ten percent of adjusted basis deduction under GILTI. The attempt 
seems to be to define an excess return, which is the income believed to be 
easily shifted and base eroding.65 The excess return to intangible assets is 
the villain in the income-shifting story. Our proposal is a much cleaner 
path to excess returns. 
How did we evaluate the reforms? We did a comprehensive analysis 
of the different options, but today I will focus on our effective tax rate 
simulations.66 The effective tax rate simulations show the impact of the 
proposals on investment location, income shifting, repatriation planning, 
repatriation incentives, and revenue.67 The simulations illuminate the role 
of excess returns and income shifting under the different reform 
alternatives.68 
Next, I will show you effective tax rates under the different options. 
The setup is a firm that has existing investments in two foreign 
countries.69 There is a low tax country with a five percent corporate rate, 
a high tax with a twenty-five percent corporate rate, the United States with 
the thirty percent rate, and a pure tax haven with no corporate tax rate at 
all.70 
Simulation analysis requires researchers to make some simplifying 
assumptions. Before I discuss the assumptions, let me explain more about 
the way in which the model is set up. 
The multinational has a subsidiary in a low-tax country that is 
producing a high-tech good using a U.S.-developed intangible asset.71 We 
simulate the effective tax rate of that discrete investment. The investment 
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earns an excess return of thirty percent before paying royalties for the 
parent for its contribution to its intellectual property, and the normal 
return of investment is ten percent.72 These parameter estimates are based 
on an examination of U.S. tax returns.73 For example, the profit margin 
on sales earned by Irish subsidiaries after the payment of royalties was 
three times the average margin of all subsidiaries in the 2000s.74 
There is also a routine investment in the high-tax location earning 
the normal return to capital.75 
We simulate effective tax rates with and without check-the-box. 
Before check-the-box, you could shift income out of the United States 
through the underpayment of royalties to the low-tax subsidiary, and you 
could shift income from the high to the low-tax subsidiary.76 Check-the-
box gives income shifting a supercharge.77 The multinational could shift 
to the haven from both the high-tax and the low-tax subsidiary. 
To examine how effective tax rates change with dividend exemption, 
we need to know the burden of the repatriation tax that we are removing. 
Based on analysis of U.S. tax return data, we estimated a repatriation 
burden of seven percent of income.78 We used a rate of five percent in the 
analysis to be conservative.79 
To calculate the effective tax rate, you add up all the taxes paid on 
an investment and divide by the normal return to capital.80 
The first system we considered was full inclusion.81 Under this 
system, the effective tax rate would be thirty percent.82 
I think the next results are eye-popping. Remember, we are looking 
at a discrete, high-tech investment abroad in a low-tax country. Making 
the investment enables income shifting and, in our model, we shift the tax 
savings to the investment in the low-tax subsidiary.83 Allowing for check-
the-box, we see an effective tax rate of -23.6 percent under the prior 
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system.84 The prior system gave quite a big subsidy to investing abroad.85 
Check-the-box, as you can see, had a large effect on lowering the rate.86 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
 
Check-the-box also had an impact on the high-tax investment.87 The 
effective tax rate was twenty-four percent before check-the-box and is 
thirteen percent after.88 Income shifting makes the high-tax investment 
more attractive.89 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) .242 .130 
 
Dividend exemption removes the repatriation tax and, as a result, 
makes income shifting more attractive and provides a larger subsidy to 
investment abroad.90  
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
Dividend exemption -.236 -.295 
 
Finally, we get to minimum tax options that are similar to GILTI. 
First, you can see that the per country minimum tax with the fifteen 
percent corporate tax rate raises the effective tax rate closer to the 
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statutory rate in the low-tax country.91 In this case, the income will be 
“taxed at fifteen percent whether it is shifted to the tax haven or not.”92 
The effective tax rate is closer to the undistorted rate in the low-tax 
country, but is not as high as fifteen percent since there is still a 
differential between the fifteen percent and the U.S. rate.93 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
Dividend exemption -.236 -.295 
Japan minimum tax (15%)  -.236 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .056 
 
As you can see, the per country minimum tax is offsetting the income 
shifting under pure dividend exemption.94 In the high-tax country, the 
effective tax rate is below the twenty-five percent rate because there is 
still a tax benefit from using the tax haven, so we end up with an effective 
tax rate of 12.1 percent.95 In the tax haven, the firm is paying fifteen 
percent compared to twenty-five percent, so there is still an incentive for 
income shifting.96 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) .242 .130 
Dividend exemption .214 .107 
Japan minimum tax (15%)  .214 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .121 
 
Next, I want to look at the per country option with expensing. The 
expensing alternative exempts the normal investment return from home 
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country taxation and results in a negative effective tax rate.97 Firms that 
are only earning a normal return are on the same playing field as their 
competitors from other countries.98 From the minimum tax with 
expensing, we calculate an effective tax rate of -4.4 percent.99 Even with 
expensing, the minimum tax results in a much higher effective tax rate in 
a low-tax country than under the previous system: -4.4 percent versus -
23.3 percent.100 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
Dividend exemption -.236 -.295 
Japan minimum tax (15%)  -.236 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .056 
with expensing  -.044 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) .242 .130 
Dividend exemption .214 .107 
Japan minimum tax (15%)  .214 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .121 
with expensing  .121 
 
With the overall minimum tax, if the parent is above the threshold, it 
owes no minimum tax and we are back to dividend exemption.101 If the 
parent is below the threshold, then all additional income is taxed at fifteen 
percent, so there is no longer any incentive to shift foreign income to the 
haven or from the high-tax country to the low-tax.102 
With the overall minimum tax, the effective tax rate goes up a small 
amount because there is no shifting from the high-tax to the low-tax 
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operation.103 The overall minimum tax generates effective tax rates that 
are much closer to the undistorted country rate than under the previous 
system.104 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
Dividend exemption -.236 -.295 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .056 









Prior law (with 30% rate) .242 .130 
Dividend exemption .214 .107 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .121 




We also examined the overall minimum tax with expensing. Of 
course, expensing is going to lower effective tax rates.105 Because you are 
below the threshold for the high-tax investment, the effective tax rate is 
going to be zero with expensing.106 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) -.182 -.236 
Dividend exemption -.236 -.295 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .056 
with expensing  -.044 
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Overall minimum tax for parent 
with ETR<15% 
 .060 
Overall minimum tax for parent 
with ETR<15% with expensing 
 -.040 
 





Prior law (with 30% rate) .242 .130 
Dividend exemption .214 .107 
Per country minimum tax (15%)  .121 
Overall minimum tax for parent 
with ETR<15% 
 .150 
Overall minimum tax for parent 
with ETR<15% with expensing 
 .000 
 
I think these simulated effective tax rates are extremely informative. 
I would like to subject GILTI to this analysis. 
With GILTI, there are many extra provisions that must be modeled. 
There is the eighty percent foreign tax credit, no carry-forwards, and no 
carry-backs of foreign tax credits.107 There is the lower corporate tax rate, 
which I think is important, and there is no expensing.108 In addition, there 
is the exemption for the ten percent return.109 
We did ask whether or not the overall minimum tax would be 
successful at targeting low-tax income. We look at the distribution of 
effective tax rates on new investment for a CFC, and we divide it into 
effective tax rate categories.110 If you look at the zero to ten percent 
category, you see that forty-five percent of total earnings and profits was 
in CFCs with effective tax rates of less than ten percent.111 
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The overall minimum tax would successfully target low-tax income. 
Under the overall minimum tax, only 16.5 percent of the total earnings 
and profits were held in CFCs with effective tax rates of less than ten 
percent.112 The per country minimum tax reduces that percentage even 
more.113 
 
Distributions of ETRs on New Investment 
 Percentage of total income 
ETR category Prior law 
Overall 
minimum tax at 
15% 
Per country 
minimum tax at 
10% 
0 to <5% 36.8 12.6  
5% to <10% 9.1 3.9  
10% 0.4 0.3 42.3 
Greater than 
10% to < 15% 
7.4 5.3 11.0 
15% 0.3 37.1 0.3 
Greater than 
15% to < 20% 
8.6 7.5 8.1 
20% to < 25% 6.9 6.1 7.4 
25% to < 30% 6.5 5.7 6.8 
30% and above 24.0 21.5 24.2 
 
We conclude that overall minimum tax does target companies that 
have the greatest opportunities for income shifting.114 One of the things 
that we know based on tax return data is that multinationals that are R&D 
intensive and earning high worldwide profit margins have the low 
effective tax rates, so the overall minimum tax is hitting the right firms.115 
Formulas are not the answer to the income shifting problem. I think 
the answer is something such as GILTI. We now have to work on figuring 
out what design elements need to be changed and how to change them. 
To wrap up, I am guilty of liking GILTI. Better put, I am guilty of 
liking the idea of pairing a minimum tax with a territorial tax system. The 
idea of GILTI in the first place was to strike a balance between income-
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shifting concerns and competitiveness concerns, and—because I think 
both of them are important—I am guilty of liking it. 
Details do matter. The impact of GILTI depends on the facts of each 
multinational. That was true under the prior system, but it is true with a 
vengeance in the new system. 
What design elements of the GILTI do I think need to be 
reconsidered? I think we need to think about everything. Why not have 
expensing? Why keep the expensing allocations? Why a fifty percent 
deduction? While there are a lot of design elements to study, I think that 
the minimum tax with and without expensing has important advantages 
over the prior system. 
It turns out that we can make progress in several directions with the 
minimum tax relative to the extremes of the pure worldwide and pure 
territorial. You end the lockout effect, you improve the efficiency of 
investment location decisions with no loss of competitiveness. You 
reduce income shifting and tax planning, and you increase revenue. 
So, I am guilty of liking GILTI! I hope you found that informative. 
MR. PHILLIPSON: Thank you, Professor Altshuler. With that, we 
will take a short break and then we will hear from the first panel. 
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PANEL I 
PROF. KYSAR: First, I want to thank everyone for coming and to 
the students and advisors to the Corporate Journal for allowing me to 
host this symposium. The Journal has a tradition of bringing together 
practitioners, legal academics, policymakers, economists, and present and 
former government officials for this conference, and I think that format is 
well suited to the subject matter because the subject demands a mixture 
of viewpoints. I think it is a very good fit, and I am happy to have a forum 
to focus specifically on the international provisions of the new bill. I think 
they deserve their own forum given their depth. 
The international provisions, although they were described as 
reducing base erosion and profit shifting, actually lose revenues going 
forward.116 According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), eighty 
percent of profit shifting is going to be maintained—but even this estimate 
might prove optimistic because the CBO does not take into account, for 
instance, investor reactions to the instability of the Foreign-Derived 
Intangible Income (FDII) regime due to potential World Trade 
Organization (WTO) challenges, investor reactions to the political 
instability of the legislation in general, and the potential for tax 
competition for other countries.117 
Now, it may be in the United States’ interest to tolerate some profit 
shifting—as I think Dan is going to discuss—but, it is probably unlikely 
that we have settled on the right amount. Indeed, recently reported tax 
rates following enactment of the bill—such as AbbVie’s rate of nine 
percent down from twenty-two percent—confirm that many profit-
shifting opportunities may exist.118 
The 2018 balance of payments data suggests that firms have not lost 
their desire to book profits abroad in low-tax jurisdictions.119 Bloomberg 
recently interviewed tax lawyers who were advising the big 
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multinationals.120 The lawyers all said that the law has not removed 
incentives to shift profits abroad and that their clients are proceeding with 
business as usual and that the new law causes them only to “tweak around 
the edges” of planning.121 
The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis 
has concurred, saying that there is reason to believe that the incentives for 
profit shifting are still there.122 
What about the fact that they have all these trapped earnings 
overseas, and now companies have deemed repatriation and can use them 
to fund domestic activities? Well, there is more bad news here. The effects 
of the repatriation may be small, according to CBO.123 In fact, the data 
that has come in suggests that the repatriations are only trickling in.124 
The further irony is that, by pursuing dramatic corporate rate 
reduction and not raising more revenues in the international provisions, 
we have created massive deficits.125 These deficits are going to contribute 
to political instability with regard to the legislation, which, in turn, makes 
companies even less willing to invest here.126 
All of this suggests that the reforms are a token effort at reforming 
the taxation of our multinationals and that real reform would have been 
more ambitious about tackling these problems.127 So, perhaps we were 
doing this to appease our trading partners who were up in arms over the 
low rate our high-profit multinationals face. 
Pause here to think about the price that we paid for this progress—
that the need for international tax reform was the tail wagging the dog. 
But, by shrinking revenues over the next decade, we have left the country 
with fewer resources.128 By so doing, rather than achieving real reform of 
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business taxation, we have created instead incentives like the pass-
through deduction, which was aimed at creating parity with the lower rate 
available on corporate income but allows for distortive tax planning.129 In 
turn, the lower corporate rate was the quid pro quo for all of the purported 
base erosion and profit-shifting protection.130 
I think it is fair, then, to ask a lot of the international tax regime; yet, 
the provisions, I think in many respects, are falling short. So, perhaps we 
could see this as a missed opportunity. If, on the other hand, you have an 
optimistic view of the legislative process, then further reforms can be 
made. Perhaps this Act could be viewed as a bridge to true reform. 
Should we be optimistic about the ability to make improvements 
here? I think, on a fundamental level, I would argue that even if Congress 
is able to break through to enact bipartisan legislation in this area, we are 
stymied by the web of thousands of international agreements that 
comprise the international tax system. 
Tax treaties, which I am going to talk about for the remainder of my 
time, are interesting creatures. They have essentially remained fairly fixed 
over the past 100 or so years.131 Since the 1920s, our treaties have retained 
the same basic structure wherein the source country, where the income 
arises, cedes substantial jurisdiction to the residence countries where the 
taxpayer resides.132 The world has changed a lot since the 1920s, to say 
the least. We have had a massive growth in capital flows. The global 
economy and multinational corporations have arisen, and, more recently, 
the digital economy has been created.133 
So, even with the modest reforms that we have enacted, we are 
seeing the many ways in which the new law interfaces poorly with the tax 
treaty system, particularly the jurisdictional provisions of the treaties.134 
The Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT) may violate 
nondiscrimination provisions, such as the requirement to offer double tax 
relief, for instance—I will go into that if people want to talk about it, but 
I may be more skeptical of those arguments than David or Fadi might be. 
Essentially, if we are thinking about strengthening source-based 
taxation, we are doing so with these treaties still in place. That is affecting 
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our reforms in this area. For instance, the more ambitious excise tax 
originally proposed by the House would have left room for much less 
circumvention.135 This is partly because—unlike the BEAT, which 
exempts costs of goods sold, including embedded royalties—the House 
excise tax applied to costs of goods sold.136 Unfortunately, because it 
applied to costs of goods sold, it likely would have violated the arm’s-
length principle of the treaties. 
Prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the proposed destination-based 
cash flow tax was also heavily criticized for it being incompatible with 
the treaties.137 For instance, it was said that the tax would have violated 
the permanent establishment requirement in treaties, which requires that 
there be physical presence in order for the source country to assert 
jurisdiction over a business income, and this is because the destination-
based cash flow tax (DBCFT) would have taxed goods where they were 
sold versus where income was originating.138 The idea behind the DBCFT 
was that taxing based on destination is less gameable than taxing where 
value is created.139 So the very feature that made the DBCFT desirable is 
the same trait that made it incompatible with the treaties—taxing at 
destination versus origin. 
This problem is not particular to the United States. Currently, 
European countries are exploring ways to tax digital services.140 Just 
recently, the EU Council Legal Service issued an opinion asserting that 
the digital services tax is not an indirect tax, which makes it harder to 
contend that tax treaties are not in conflict with it.141 The digital service 
tax—although it is, in my view, fundamentally flawed because it focuses 
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only on digital companies—is also likely to suffer from design problems 
because its proponents have attempted to enact it within the treaty-based 
context of a permanent establishment, stretching that concept to the point 
of disbelief, and also justifying it by using notoriously vague concepts of 
value creation which also set no reliable architecture for the new tax.142 
The common theme here is that countries are looking at ways to tax at 
destination or to strengthen their inbound taxation, but this is antithetical 
to the fundamental deal cut in our tax agreements and, as a result, I think 
the proposals have suffered. 
In short, reform would have looked different without these 
agreements in place, and until we rethink the treaty system, I think we are 
perhaps likely to only obtain meek reform. So, rather than critiquing all 
these new taxes for violating the treaties and trying to shape them to 
conform to the treaty system, I argue that it is the tax treaties we should 
critique for not being able to accommodate fundamental reform.143 This 
critique is made even worse because tax treaties, I think, do not fulfill 
their stated purposes. 
The conventional account is that tax treaties are there to alleviate 
double taxation.144 Without tax treaties, multiple countries would tax the 
same amount of income, yet, unilateral methods of alleviating double 
taxation exist.145 Foreign tax credits and exemption systems mean that the 
resident’s country is foregoing tax on at least a portion of foreign-source 
income (FSI).146 Moreover, tax treaties by and large do not resolve 
problems of double taxation that are left open by the domestic statute.147 
We see here that, with regard to different kinds of double taxation, 
jurisdictional provisions of the treaties do little work. Essentially, the tax 
treaties are solving problems that are already solved by the domestic 
statute and are not solving problems that are not solved by the domestic 
statute. 
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Even if we assume tax treaties solve problems of double taxation, is 
this something for which we should strive? Dan has written that this is a 
fairly arbitrary marker.148 Investors care about the total level of taxation. 
They could be paying less tax if they were paying Country A and Country 
B at ten percent on the same item of income than if they paid forty percent 
to Country A. Economists aim for creating neutrality between investment 
decisions, but double taxation may create the means to do so if taxpayers 
face, for instance, twenty percent in Country A on cross-border income 
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Theoretically, if you have identical tax systems and identical 
investment flows, then there should be economic surplus resulting from 
establishing neutrality between single-country and cross-country income 
through the bilateral agreements. But, countries do not have identical tax 
systems, and they do not have identical investment flows. 
Additionally, the original bargain was for the source country to 
relinquish jurisdiction so the residence country could tax the income, but 
the residence country is not taxing the income for the most part, in part 
because it needs to attract corporations.149 
Instead of alleviating double non-taxation, which is a new purpose 
of tax treaties under base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS),150 tax treaties 
contribute to it. 
Troublingly, there are no formal economic or revenue estimates of 
tax treaties. This may not have been much of a concern to the United 
States in the early years of the treaties when the United States was a net 
capital exporter.151 Since the 1970s, however, the United States has 
become a net capital importer,152 meaning it may lose revenues under the 
treaties because its revenues lost as a source country are not offset by the 
revenues it gains as a residence country. 
We should consider two offsetting considerations when we think 
about revenues under the tax treaty. First, the treaty country gets increased 
residual taxation sitting as the residence country. Secondly, however, the 
source country gets reduced source taxation. If you are a capital-importing 
nation, you are generally losing revenues; if you are a capital-exporting 
nation, you are generally gaining revenues. 
I am in the process of trying to shed some light on this question by 
examining data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. 
Department of Treasury.153 Of sixty-four out of sixty-six treaty countries, 
thirty-seven countries had more holdings by that country’s residence of 
U.S. securities than U.S. holdings of those countries’ securities; so, in 
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total, the amount of inflows among these treaty countries exceeded 
outflows by $4.5 trillion last year.154 
 
So, it seems like we may be in danger of losing revenues under the 
treaties. This highlights what I think is a major danger of tax treaties: they 
become so entrenched and, yet, economic flows can reverse rather quickly 
and dramatically to the point where the treaties no longer are in the 
national interest. 
One way to pare down the treaties is to get rid of these jurisdictional 
provisions that allocate taxing jurisdiction in a way that preserves double 
nontaxation and prevents true reform of our inbound system. Specifically, 
I propose in a forthcoming paper that we could use the multilateral 
instrument to scale down those provisions or allow nations to opt out of 
them while still maintaining other treaty provisions, such as 
nondiscrimination and dispute resolution.155 Essentially, the idea is that 
this could lead to a more heterogeneous international tax system that 
reflects the diversity of countries, their tax laws, and their investment 
flows. 
Leveraging the multilateral instrument in this manner would be 
essentially a deliberate and ordered unraveling of the tax treaties, which 
may make some of us uncomfortable, but I suggest that we should not 
panic here. If we do not intentionally unwind the treaties, I think nations 
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Data analysis
■ 2017 BEA Bilateral Balance of Payments
– Of 17 treaty countries, U.S. was net borrower with 
12, amounting to net borrowing of $166B
– Remaining 5 produced net lending of $47.79B
■ 2017 Treasury Annual Survey
– Of 64 treaty countries, 37 had inflows greater 
than outflows
– Inflows exceeded outflows by $4.54T
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are going to start simply turning to self-help circumventions of the treaties 
as we are already starting to see. Yet, those self-help circumventions are 
going to be less effective because they are influenced by the treaty 
structure, resulting in uncertainty without good tax design. 
Thank you. 
PROF. SHAVIRO: One thing I liked about the international tax 
provisions in the 2017 Act was that they may have helped put to rest a 
way of thinking about the issues that I have been saying for a long time is 
misconceived. There is all this talk about worldwide and territorial 
systems—which should we have? 
Virtually no country has a full version of either. I do not know of any 
pure worldwide systems with no current taxation of foreign subs’ income. 
So-called territorial systems generally have controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules that tax some foreign-source income.156 So, we 
really have neither type of system in anything like their pure forms. 
People in the United States were debating whether we should go to 
a territorial system; there was a lot of rhetoric about that.157 Then, you get 
a Republican Congress unilaterally making new tax policy, and that is 
friendly with business interests, so you might think this is when it is 
actually going to happen. But then the dog caught the bus. Once Congress 
actually had to pass a statute that would take effect, the Republicans 
decided immediately that a territorial system was not what they wanted, 
because they were worried about things like profit shifting.158 
This was not just something that happened in midstream, such as 
changing the corporate rate in the legislation from twenty to twenty-one 
percent.159 To the contrary, the very first statements of principles made it 
clear that they had—well, as you read the Act, it is not clear exactly what 
they had in mind —but you could see, ex post, they had in mind the 
provisions they actually ended up enacting. They were never going to go 
to a pure territorial system, because it would not have satisfied their 
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aims.160 Even in earlier years, when the Republican Ways and Means 
Chair Dave Camp proposed a “territorial” system, it was not truly 
territorial.161 
Repealing deferral—which, of course, pure worldwide and pure 
territorial people both dislike—does not amount to going territorial.162 
What the United States did was replace now-or-later taxation of foreign 
source income with now-or-never taxation.163 But, they significantly 
expanded the “now” category by adding things like Global Intangible 
Low-Tax Income (GILTI).164 
Without endorsing or condemning what Congress did in the 
international tax frame, I think it does help to show that a lot of this talk 
about worldwide versus territorial taxation was simply missing the issues 
that countries care about. I have been beating this drum for a while, and I 
have said that worldwide and territorial are a bad way analytically to think 
about international tax systems. One reason is that they differ at two 
margins, not one. It is not like: “should we have ice cream or should we 
not have ice cream?” or similarly, “should we tax the normal return to 
capital like an income tax does or should we not do it like a pure 
consumption tax does?” Instead, the two types of international tax 
systems differ at two margins. The first is the tax rate for foreign-source 
income. In a pure worldwide system, it is the same as the tax rate for 
domestic-source income, while, in a pure territorial system, it is zero.165 
Then, they differ at a second margin—what I call the “marginal 
reimbursement rate” for foreign taxes. In a pure worldwide system, the 
marginal reimbursement rate is 100 percent.166 You get a foreign tax credit 
that fully offsets your foreign tax liability and makes the net after 
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domestic tax cost to you zero. By contrast, in a pure territorial system, 
foreign taxes are ignored.167 
In earlier work, I have pointed out that this makes territoriality a pure 
deductibility system for foreign taxes.168 That is a system in which the 
marginal tax rate for foreign-source income and the marginal 
reimbursement rate for foreign taxes are the same, which is exactly what 
you get from a deduction.169 It causes the taxpayer to try to maximize 
after-foreign tax income rather than pre-foreign tax income.170 
If you take a territorial system in which you think you are just 
ignoring foreign taxes rather than deducting them, and convert it to a tax 
system with a 0.00001 percent rate in which foreign taxes are expressly 
deductible, you would see the two are rather similar. That can help 
persuade you, I hope, that territoriality is an implicit deductibility system 
for foreign taxes.171 
I do not think it is a good analysis to have two different margins that 
you should think about in two different ways, and conflate them together. 
The literature does not clearly distinguish between these two margins 
sometimes.172 I think it is better for clear thinking to have the two things 
distinguished, though I am not urging a particular policy conclusion. 
So, why would you have these two frames? Why would you only 
consider polar alternatives at each of the two margins? Why does the tax 
rate on foreign-source income have to be either zero percent or the same 
as the domestic rate? Can it be in between—which, of course, as Rosanne 
pointed out, GILTI does?173 How about the treatment of foreign taxes? 
Could they be treated as better than deductible but worse than fully 
creditable? Why do you only have polar alternatives? Why would you 
have an arbitrary linkage between the two approaches? 
People have done some very good work in which they looked at 
different countries’ tax systems. For example, it was a very nice job by 
Altshuler, Toder, and Shay, two of whom are in the room today, in which 
they look at differences, and they say: “Everyone’s a hybrid. No one is 
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pure worldwide, and no one’s pure territorial.”174 This is a good point—
but, of course, if everything is a hybrid, the term does not tell you very 
much. It is not a very descriptive term if it fits all systems. Also, it does 
not tell you why the United States would have changed from one hybrid 
system to another hybrid system. The motivation for that obviously lay 
outside the standard framework. 
The worldwide-versus-territorial framework also fails to illuminate 
margins about which countries actually seem to care. I think the 2017 Tax 
Act, regardless of whether one endorses it or not—and I do agree with 
Rosanne that it is a potential improvement or could be turned into an 
improvement and maybe already is—is a nice marker of the concerns that 
countries actually do appear to have. 
Here is an important question that many countries care about: how 
should effective tax rates for multinationals compare to those of purely 
domestic companies? The pizza parlor at the corner is not going to move 
to Paris or to the Bahamas, but, by contrast, multinationals are more 
mobile. 
It is quite clear that, rightly or wrongly, countries often are motivated 
to try to tax multinationals at a lower effective rate than domestic 
companies.175 The way to do it, without admitting to it and having explicit 
ring-fencing, is to allow them to do some profit shifting. You decide that 
you are happy with them doing some of it. This is an important reason 
why countries traditionally have tolerated some profit shifting—because 
they thought they had something to gain from making inbound investment 
more attractive to multinationals than it would be if the effective rate 
equaled the full domestic rate. I am not arguing here whether that is right 
or wrong, but I suspect it might be right. It seems very clear that countries 
often have thought that way. 
The OECD-BEPS process presumably reflected that countries had 
started to think, “Hey, you are doing too much profit-shifting now,” and 
that helps show the other side of it. Even if you want to give 
multinationals a little bit of a break, that does not mean you want them to 
go “too far” in avoiding your income taxes. 
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There are many reasons for taxing multinationals at a positive rate, 
and perhaps even a significant one: they may be earning rents that you 
can capture, you are worried about domestic companies being taxed at a 
lower rate than multinationals which creates various problems like tax 
reasons for mergers with foreign companies, or you are worried about 
resident individuals’ labor income. For example, how are you going to tax 
Steve Jobs when he is getting one dollar a year of salary from Apple? 
When he was alive, the answer was that you tax Apple. Since he is a 
shareholder with stock and options, that is how you tax Steve Jobs, via 
Apple. Of course, we were not doing that much, and Apple was moving 
most of its profits abroad.176 
So, you may want to tax foreign-source income at between zero and 
the full domestic rate, and you may also want to over-measure 
multinationals’ domestic-source income because you think they are 
understating it through profit-shifting, and even if you like some shifting, 
you may think they are doing too much. 
Again, this does not mean that GILTI and BEAT are good, but they 
clearly are responding to this type of concern. They create a foreign tax 
rate on foreign-source income for domestic companies that is in between 
the domestic rate and zero.177 Also, through the BEAT, you effectively 
over-measure companies’ domestic-source income, by assuming that the 
correct transfer price is zero.178 You are only doing this under the BEAT, 
which has a ten percent rate, but that is in response, I presume, to the 
belief that, through transfer pricing, they are excessively lowering their 
regular income tax liabilities. 
Here is a second question countries care about, and are right to care 
about: taxing resident versus foreign multinationals. As soon as you have 
CFC rules, you are treating your resident companies worse than foreign 
companies—at least in this respect—because the latter are not subject to 
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CFC rules, as they cannot be taxed, at least explicitly, on their foreign 
subsidiaries’ foreign-source income.179 Very often, the reason for CFC 
rules is that you are concerned about profit shifting. 
If you have CFC rules, you have decided in that respect to treat 
resident multinationals worse than foreign multinationals. Why would 
you do that? Suppose that the two types of companies are not 
systematically different. If they are, then you might have further reasons 
for doing it. You might think, for example, that the resident ones are the 
ones that are really earning income at home because they are in Silicon 
Valley and so forth. But, you may want to treat the resident companies 
worse, even if they are not systematically different from the foreign 
companies, on the ground that CFC rules give you the ability to identify 
and tax what you deem to be “bad” foreign-source income. Both 
conventional CFC rules and GILTI make use of this arguably more 
refined tool. 
You may think that some types of foreign-source income are more 
indicative of undesired profit shifting than other types. For example, with 
stuff that shows up in the Cayman Islands, you may be suspicious that it 
has been shifted excessively out of the domestic tax base than, say, if 
someone has a car factory in Germany. The availability of a more refined 
tool may alone cause you to tax the resident multinationals more than 
foreign multinationals, even if you have no direct desire to do so. You 
might wish you could use it for them all, but since you cannot, at least 
you may use it for the ones you can, resulting in a tradeoff. You are using 
this better tool to accomplish what you want toward these companies, but 
you are also disfavoring them against foreign multinationals, which you 
may not want to do. 
I think it is clear—and I have argued this in print—that the United 
States, pre-2017 Act, whether we did too much or too little to fight profit 
shifting overall, was concentrating the effort too much on resident versus 
foreign multinationals.180 The reason is that we were relying on our CFC 
rules, whereas countries like Germany and the United Kingdom, as I 
understand it, had tougher rules on earnings stripping, which can 
potentially hit all the multinationals more equally.181 
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Obviously, the BEAT is an attempt to address that. It applies to 
foreign as well as domestic multinationals, unlike GILTI. Again, not to 
say it is a good or bad rule, but it was addressing a real concern. 
A third point that countries care about is specifically defining bad 
FSI, perhaps in cases where it seems indicative of profit shifting that is 
beyond the amount that you want the companies to do. This is something 
that comes out of papers such as Altshuler, Toder, and Shay.182 They, and 
several other papers, as well as a Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
study, found the same thing: before GILTI, there was a considerable 
similarity between different countries’ CFC rules.183 In general, they are 
anti-tax haven rules. They focus either on the fact that you paid very little 
tax because the income was in fact reported as arising in a tax haven, or 
they focus on its being the type of income that is easily shifted.184 For 
example, income that gets run through conduits, along with passive 
income, generally can be put wherever you like. 
Countries seem to agree with each other, to a considerable degree, 
on what is “bad” foreign-source income that you might want to tax. What 
they do not agree on, and what people just within the United States do not 
agree about, is whether we should hit this stuff relatively hard or relatively 
lightly. 
There is a tradeoff to consider. On the one hand, from a unilateral 
standpoint, why would you want your companies to pay high rather than 
low taxes on foreign-source income? If U.S. shareholders own a U.S. 
company and you are acting unilaterally—we are not thinking about other 
countries’ welfare and we are not engaged in strategic cooperation with 
them—why are we not glad that they avoid German taxes? Just 
considered for itself, from a unilateral standpoint, we should be glad, 
because we do not get the money from German tax payments. On the 
other hand, when we see stuff in a tax haven, we may think it indicates 
undesired profit-shifting from the United States, whereas, again, if you 
have the car factory in Germany, we may not think that is going on to a 
comparable degree. 
So, determining how to treat low-tax foreign-source income involves 
a tradeoff, and this is the flip side of how to treat paying high foreign 
taxes. I think we saw evidence of concern about these things in Rosanne’s 
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talk.185 She noted the desirability of focusing on low-tax foreign-source 
income despite the fact that it might be good to pay lower rather than high 
foreign taxes.186 Additionally, she was glad that there is only an eighty 
percent rather than a 100 percent foreign tax credit in GILTI.187 
Again, it is a tradeoff. Do we want our companies to avoid foreign 
taxes? There might be reasons to be glad that they are doing this. On the 
other hand, when you see it happening, you might think other bad stuff is 
going on, so you want to tax the low-taxed foreign source income more 
heavily. Obviously, GILTI is in the ballpark of addressing this issue. 
Finally, I will mention the marginal reimbursement rate for foreign 
taxes. I think it is nuts to have a complete lack of cost sensitivity regarding 
foreign tax obligations. When people were thinking about a simple global 
minimum tax, they thought: what if we make you pay fifteen percent 
globally, and companies that are paying zero respond by now paying 
fifteen percent more to other countries? What is in it for the United States? 
I think that is why they came up with the eighty percent foreign tax credit 
in GILTI. 
Foreign tax creditability, if allowed immediately and in full, is 
simply too generous from a unilateral national welfare standpoint. By 
contrast, foreign tax deductibility—going back to Peggy Musgrave’s 
famous national neutrality standard, but without assuming that one must 
apply the full domestic rate on foreign source income—would be 
unilaterally optimal except: (1) if there are strategic interactions with 
other countries, and (2) if low foreign taxes indicate that you have 
engaged in “too much” sheltering and profit shifting. That provides a 
selfish unilateral reason to target tax haven income, which I think 
countries feel. 
Fadi and Mitchell Kane have both written about how you can have a 
tax rate that is greater than zero, and offer less than 100 percent foreign 
tax credits, without violating tax treaties.188 Since Fadi is here, I will not 
say anything more about that. Again, GILTI is in the ballpark of doing 
this. 
The problem with all these issues is that there is no consensus about 
any of them. Their bottom line merits are not well understood. We do not 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See supra pp. 234-41. 
 186. See supra pp. 232-41. 
 187. See supra pp. 236-40. 
 188. Mitchell Kane, International Tax Reform, the Tragedy of the Tax Commons, and 
Bilateral Tax Treaties 21-23 (May 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
258 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
know what the right answers are, or whether current law burdens are too 
high or too low at a given margin. Right answers also may vary between 
countries and across time. 
I like to say that each of them offers a Goldilocks question. The little 
girl in the bears’ house is quite confident about judging the porridge that 
she tastes. One is too hot, one is too cold, and the third is just right. But 
until we get her working for the JCT doing revenue estimates or policy 
analysis, we are not as lucky as she is. We do not know when a particular 
tax burden is too hot, too cold, or just right. 
I did want to do one more thing: a quick word on the 2017 Act 
changes. FDII and GILTI are in the ballpark of addressing significant 
concerns that lack clear answers. If I had another twenty minutes, I would 
talk in detail about what I think is right and wrong about them. They each 
have significant conceptual and design problems, even taking as given the 
aims and the degree of rigor, which again—too hot, too cold—is very hard 
to answer. Each could be significantly improved. I do not know if they 
will be because I do not know where our political system is going. Even 
when I think of no-brainer improvements that could be done without 
changing their rigor—there are a bunch of things again I could talk about 
if I had the time—I do not know if that will happen. 
FDII would also be in the ballpark if it were just a patent box. As 
Rosanne said, there are arguments for a patent box.189 Michael Graetz has 
said that it is probably not a great idea, and that is based on a careful 
analysis.190 I think he would agree that, in theory, it would be possible for 
a patent box to be a good idea for a given country. 
Unfortunately, however, FDII is an export subsidy. That makes it 
indefensible economically because countries do not benefit from export 
subsidies. It makes it hard to defend legally under the WTO. It makes it 
hard to defend administratively because there is simply no good answer 
to the problem of round-tripping—you export to get the subsidy and then 
bring it back in. FDII is just a bad rule, but if you had a patent box, once 
again, it might be in the ballpark of something we could debate and see 
whether we like it or not. 
PROF. MORSE: What I want to propose and explore is that the 2017 
Act and the international provisions have a lot to do with cooperation. It 
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is funny because their headline was not cooperation. Their headline was 
competitiveness and a huge reduction in the corporate tax rate, and I do 
not deny that that was expensive. Nor do I deny that that may be 
problematic, a drag that results from a big extra deficit. But I am an 
optimist, so I hope you will permit me to explore something more 
cheerful, which is the possibility that the international provisions and 
especially GILTI will perhaps end up saving the corporate tax. This is so 
not because of the stated intention of the 2017 Act, but rather because the 
statutory framework of GILTI is fundamentally cooperative. 
In order to like this argument, you have to like the corporate tax. 
Some of you may depart from me here, but there are reasons to like it. 
Perhaps you think it must exist because the individual income tax exists, 
and you take the point that I think Rosanne made, which is that if tax rates 
are more equal around the world, there will be less distortion.191 Or, 
maybe you like the idea of having a positive corporate tax rate in the 
United States, and you believe that, in order for that to happen, there have 
to be positive tax rates elsewhere. If you are in that camp or you can accept 
the assumption for the purposes of the next ten minutes, then you can 
listen to my cheerful presentation, and perhaps see if you agree with it. 
After the 2017 Act, what the United States says to CFCs is this: either 
pay corporate income tax to a foreign jurisdiction, or we will tax you.192 
This is not what the United States said before the Act. Dan calls the Act 
a “now-or-never” tax, with which I agree.193 But I would characterize the 
prior-to-the-Act regime as a “maybe-later” regime, not “now-or-later” but 
“maybe-later,” and in fact probably-not-later because there is no reason 
that U.S. multinationals had to distribute dividends and pay taxes on the 
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profit of their non-U.S. subsidiaries. In fact, there were many reasons for 
U.S. multinationals not to repatriate.194 
Basically what the GILTI provision does is to take a piece of CFC 
income that previously, perhaps, would never be taxed and tax it at least 
to some extent.195 GILTI does not claim all the resulting revenue for the 
United States. But at least it ensures that more CFC income is taxed 
somewhere, and that is what I view as the cooperative headline of the 
international corporate tax that we have after the 2017 Act. 
If the core message is this cooperative message, that corporate 
income ought to be taxed somewhere, then one question we can ask is, 
“So what? Why do we really care about that?” The answer is that the 
cooperative framework affects what should happen now. One current 
discussion involves concerns about treaty violations or WTO obligations, 
as I think Rebecca and Fadi will discuss with respect to different elements 
of the Act.196 Another current discussion involves what the United States 
should do for guidance. I am going to focus on the second part, and 
specifically on expense allocation, to illustrate how the proposed idea 
about cooperation might influence government guidance. 
There is language in the legislative history which says that under 
GILTI there should not be any U.S. residual tax on foreign income if that 
foreign income is taxed at 13.125 percent197 or, by implication, 16.4 
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percent after 2025.198 The reason this is interesting for current guidance 
questions is that there is an inclination among tax practitioners to say that 
the legislative history means that you, the Treasury, must make sure that 
we, the taxpayer, if we pay 13.125 percent or more in foreign tax, we do 
not pay U.S. residual tax.199 That is what taxpayers suggest that the 
legislative history statement means. 
What I want to point out—and this is illuminated by the idea that the 
GILTI advances a cooperative goal—is that there is another way to read 
that legislative history statement. The other way to read that legislative 
history statement has to do with the tax base—not the tax rate, but the tax 
base. The better interpretation is that the legislative history implicitly 
assumes the same tax base for U.S. and non-U.S. purposes or in other 
words for calculating both the U.S. foreign tax credit limitation and the 
non-U.S. foreign income tax base. 
That could mean that the Treasury is expected to go around and 
equalize everybody’s tax base, U.S. and foreign, but I do not think it 
means that. I think it should be read as an observation that GILTI works 
as intended if tax bases coordinate, so that there is the same tax base for 
U.S. foreign tax credit limitation purposes and for non-U.S. foreign 
income tax calculation purposes. But the legislative history does not 
imply that the Treasury is responsible for fixing discrepancies. 
I do not think the Treasury should try to fix all tax base problems. 
The reason is that they are going to mess it up. They cannot do a good job 
with it because, no matter what rule they make, it will not work for 
everybody, and it will be able to be arbitraged. But I do think that there is 
a group of people who would do a pretty good job trying to make sure the 
tax bases are equal, and that is taxpayers. Right now, taxpayers face some 
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U.S. rules, for instance for interest allocation, that allocate deductions to 
foreign source income for foreign tax credit limitation purposes even if 
taxpayers cannot deduct those amounts for non-U.S. foreign income tax 
base purposes.200 This tax base problem is in safe hands, because 
taxpayers have a strong incentive to align their tax bases so as to also 
deduct amounts for foreign income tax purposes and align their non-U.S. 
foreign income tax obligations with their U.S. foreign tax credit 
limitation. U.S. multinationals might, for instance, add their CFCs as co-
borrowers to facilitate foreign income tax deductions for interest. 
So, how about this for an idea? Do not issue guidance. Do not worry 
about the interest expense allocation. Do not try to fix a problem that 
taxpayers have the incentive to fix. Is there not enough room in the foreign 
interest allocation provisions and other expense allocation provisions for 
taxpayers, if they so choose, to equalize the tax bases, both in the United 
States and foreign? Then there is no reason to complain, for example, that 
if interest is allocated against foreign income for U.S. foreign tax credit 
limitation purposes but not for non-U.S. foreign income tax base 
purposes, then the foreign tax credit limitation is less than the foreign tax 
liability and everything gets messed up. Taxpayers should change their 
interest allocation tax planning. Do what you need to do to get there. 
I do not know exactly how far this argument goes because I am not 
conversant enough with all of the limitations that foreign law imposes, 
but my guess would be that there is some flexibility. 
That is what I would like to leave you with—that, in the midst of all 
this confusion, in my cheerful simplicity I see basically a classic 
cooperative message of, “there is foreign tax, and if there’s not, there’s 
U.S. tax.” 
It is not unlike the effect anticipated when the United States first 
unilaterally adopted the foreign tax credit.201 As we move forward with 
the implementation of this Act, cooperation on tax base and tax rate can 
be guiding principles. But it is not necessarily the Treasury, in my view, 
that will be the only responsible party or the only source of action in 
getting there. 
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PROF. GRAETZ: I used to be an optimist, and contrary to Rosanne’s 
suggestion that the new bill will keep you from retiring early, I am rapidly 
moving in the opposite direction.202 
I have to say—I am sitting next to Susie, and she says, “Don’t fix it, 
Treasury.” That leaves two other places that could fix it: (1) Congress—
well, good luck with that—or (2) taxpayers. I just read in The New York 
Times in 14,000 words that Fred Trump took a ninety-five percent 
discount on his valuations for estate tax purposes, so he fixed it pretty 
well.203 So, I am not sure I want to rely on taxpayers to fix everything 
either, although I do understand the point about interest allocation. 
There has been some discussion about fundamental issues. Let me 
say something else about fundamental issues. When Congress undertook 
to write the 2017 legislation, it faced many daunting challenges, and you 
should take comfort in the fact that it messed up a lot of other provisions 
worse than it messed up the international revisions—although the 
international revisions are the most daunting challenge faced by 
Congress, the OECD, individual countries, or the European Union 
because of the kinds of compromises and conflicts that Rosanne and Dan 
and others have mentioned.204 
Let me just say one other thing. I have a book—Dan’s book was 
mentioned; I did not mention mine yet. I would like to mention mine. It 
traces the history of the tax treaties, talks about patent boxes, has some 
interesting data, and is titled Follow the Money: Essays on International 
Taxation.205 I published it before the 2017 Act, so it just gives you the 
background of existing law, and the one thing all of us agree on is that 
preexisting law was terrible and needed to be fixed. I think that we all 
would agree that the efforts to fix it are better on a whole host of grounds 
than what was in place. 
In addition to the fact that the underlying norms that were supposed 
to be guiding international tax policy—what Rosanne mentioned in terms 
of capital export neutrality, capital import neutrality, and capital 
ownership neutrality—do not work and we have no good replacement for 
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them yet; concepts of corporate residence and corporate income source, 
which have been the fundamental building blocks of the international 
system, also do not work well. 
You can change residence, you can create corporations that are 
resident anywhere, you have inversions and foreign acquisitions or 
domestic acquisitions. These have been common ways to reduce taxes, 
especially on foreign income. With regard to corporate income source, 
you have mobility of intellectual property ownership and income, you 
have locations of supply chains whose income is difficult to sort out, and 
the source for financial income is very difficult to limit. So, in addition to 
reducing taxes by changing the location of a corporation’s residence, 
companies can avoid or reduce taxes by changing where income is 
sourced. This is why people are struggling toward destination-based 
concepts of one sort or another. That has been briefly mentioned here, but 
we have not talked about it a lot. 
We are also struggling with many concepts that came into the law in 
the early part of the 20th century—between 1918 and 1928—such as 
permanent establishments, arm’s-length pricing, and so forth.206 The base 
erosion profit-shifting (BEPS) efforts of the OECD, which have not been 
mentioned, stuck with all of those 20th century concepts. I think we are at 
a moment now where we are going to move away from many of those 
concepts. You can see such movement most obviously in the efforts in 
Europe, particularly with digital companies, but you also see it around the 
world in a whole host of unilateral efforts. 
The last thing I would say is that the politics for multinationals, 
particularly U.S. multinationals, are terrible around the world. Nobody 
wants to give up taxes on U.S. multinationals. If you are a foreign country, 
you do not want to give them up, and if you are the United States, you do 
not want to give them up. The politics are bad, whatever the economics 
are. 
Having said all that, I have argued since it was enacted that the 2017 
Act is unstable.207 The 2017 Act is unstable for a number of reasons: it 
includes many temporary provisions, it was enacted only by Republicans, 
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the debt and deficits it causes will be great, and many provisions that are 
supposed to terminate are not going to for a whole host of reasons. 
This graph demonstrates the costs of extending provisions that are 
supposed to expire. What you see here is that the costs grow dramatically 
over time. I will not go through all of them, but many include business 
provisions. The largest ones, of course, are the individual tax cuts and the 
pass-through provisions that are both supposed to expire, but you see the 
costs of the 2017 act increasing over time. The bottom line illustrates what 
happens if you do not believe that everything that is supposed to expire 
will expire—and, if you lived through the 2001, 2003, and 2013 
negotiations over the expiration of the Bush tax cuts, you cannot believe 
that they will all expire—then this Act is going to cost about $3 trillion 
rather than $1.5 trillion. That is for starters. 
The next slide shows the federal budget outlook with some of the 
scheduled expirations at the top. You see that they begin as early as 2019 
and then, in 2022, the interest rules change. Research and development is 
scheduled to capitalize, which is not going to happen, expensing phases 
out, and so forth. If you look at the bottom of the slide, you will see the 
deficit as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in these years—
assuming that the law is actually followed, which I do not assume—and 
PwC
Annual revenue cost of extending various tax 
provisions: 10-year cost $1.5 trillion (2019-2028)
































Pass-through provisions of TCJA
Individual provisions of TCJA excluding pass-through
Business provisions of TCJA
Health tax extenders










1)  Family medical leave credit
2)  163(j) EBITDA definition of adjustable taxable income
3)  Section 174 expensing 
4)  100% expensing 
5)  GILTI - 50% deduction (in lieu of 37.5%)
6)  FDII - 37.5% deduction (in lieu of 21.875%)
7)  BEAT - 10% rate and GBC offset
CBO (April 2018) and PwC calculations.
266 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
you are still talking about deficits in the range of five percent of GDP 
pretty quickly. 
If you look at the debt held by the public, you will see that we are up 
around ninety percent of GDP in terms of debt held by the public. All I 
will say about that is that we are now at the highest rate of debt held by 
the public that we have had since the end of the Second World War, and, 
at that time, we owed ninety-five percent of the debt to U.S. people.208 
Now, we owe nearly half of it to foreigners,209 so we are going to have to 
transfer money abroad, and interest on the federal debt is going to become 
a bigger and bigger piece of the budget, and this is going to create 
enormous pressures on both the tax and the spending sides including on 
international tax. So, there is a lot of work to be done going forward. 
Now, I want to turn to the provisions of this Act and say a few words 
about issues that we have talked about before. One issue is—and this goes 
back to what Rosanne started us with, and what others have said—that 
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there was going to be a minimum tax and that we should have a minimum 
tax. We must have a minimum tax. Dave Camp had a minimum tax in his 
bill.210 He did not call it that, and that was a Republican bill. The business 
community insisted there would not be a minimum tax; there could not 
be a minimum tax because it was going to hurt the competitiveness of 
U.S. multinationals versus foreign multinationals. So, what did they get? 
They got two minimum taxes—one with the GILTI and one with the 
BEAT—which tells you something about lobbying. 
GILTI is supposed to address outbound issues, and we have talked a 
lot about the GILTI, but I want to talk about it a bit more. The BEAT was 
enacted originally, and it was described by Rosanne, to tax inbound 
business investments, but it misses inbound transactions in two ways.211 
First, it misses transactions involving goods where royalties are 
embedded in the cost of goods sold because you can exclude costs of 
goods sold from the BEAT tax. The BEAT meant to tax royalties, and it 
misses them on goods. It hits them on services, and it is very hard to know 
in which services royalties are very important, so it hits a lot of things that 
it did not mean to hit.212 It also applies to outbound transactions where 
there is a U.S. multinational parent and not a foreign multinational.213 So, 
it misses a lot of its intended targets, and it hits a lot of targets that I think 
it meant not to hit. 
This is one provision that nobody had talked about much before the 
enactment. The legislative process was rushed in the fall of 2017. The 
BEAT was not vetted. There is a question as to whether it ought to be 
fixed or ought to be eliminated. I do not think it can be fixed in its current 
form. Enactment of the BEAT tells you that Congress does not believe 
that transfer pricing works. But maybe destination-based kinds of 
transfer-pricing alternatives will work. The BEAT does not allow a 
foreign tax credit, which is, I think, very bizarre. It gives you neither a 
deduction nor credit for foreign taxes—to use Dan’s framework. 
The GILTI also has many issues that we have not discussed. The 
eighty percent rule on foreign tax credits is obviously not the correct 
percentage. You have a fifty percent deduction and an eighty percent 
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credit.214 One might have thought that maybe you would start with a fifty 
percent credit or something else. We do not know what the right 
percentage is. 
The allocation of deduction rules, I think, are going to have to be 
dealt with by the Treasury, despite Susie’s desire to leave them to 
taxpayers. While she talked about interest—and I think this does raise a 
lot of important questions about the role of the interest limitations 
compared directly to how you deal with it on allocation—the other two 
big items are R&D and G&A. When I was at the Treasury, we had many 
discussions about allocation of R&D in calculating foreign tax credits. 
One question that I think is worth asking is: why do you want to allocate 
R&D to foreign tax credits if you want to subsidize domestic R&D? I 
think you need to separate out these expenses and think about them 
separately. G&A or headquarters expenses raise similar issues, I think. 
GILTI was put into Subpart F, or the CFC rules.215 I said at an OECD 
meeting that I knew of good cars that have been built on a truck chassis—
the Acura MDX and the Honda Pilot would be two examples. But I do 
not know of a good vehicle where you have built a truck on a car chassis. 
Putting GILTI into Subpart F and therefore interacting with the other parts 
of Subpart F, as opposed to treating it as a standalone minimum tax and 
deciding what you want as a set of minimum tax rules, I think creates lots 
of problems. 
If you read the literature—and I am sure you will hear about some of 
this from the next panel—it also creates opportunities. If the GILTI 
foreign tax credit is limited and you continue to keep, for example, base 
company income as Subpart F income, you may decide you want Subpart 
F income rather than GILTI income. For those of you who are thinking 
about a career in tax accounting or tax planning and tax advising, the good 
news is that there is going to be plenty of business in the years ahead 
because these issues will need to be straightened out, and if they are not 
straightened out, taxpayers will certainly beat you over the head and 
shoulders if you are the government. 
I just want to make two final points. First, there are a whole host of 
unilateral source-based developments that are happening now. They are 
in the United Kingdom under diverted profits tax, they are in Australia, 
they are in Japan, they are in India, they are in a whole host of countries. 
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If everybody is acting unilaterally, I think we are going to have to think 
anew about how to achieve cooperation, even if you accept Rebecca’s 
well-founded view that the bilateral tax treaty system which emerged in 
the 20th century may not exactly be the best way to go forward.216 
Finally, there are a whole host of non-neutralities and differences in 
treatment among these provisions that were not intended. I mentioned the 
BEAT treatment of goods versus services.217 I do not think that was 
intentional. Embedded services versus explicit services may be treated 
differently. Branches and subsidiaries are treated differently in a whole 
host of these provisions. 
We have talked about foreign-owned versus domestically-owned 
companies being treated differently.218 The GILTI treats tangible and 
intangible assets differently. Because of the QBAI exemption, GILTI 
treats high-basis tangible assets differently than it treats low-basis 
tangible assets.219 
Your tax will vary depending on how you disperse your profits and 
losses across a number of countries because of the way in which the 
mechanics work. Whether ownership of your intellectual property is 
foreign or domestic will change many outcomes. Whether you are a C-
corporation or whether you are a large, privately held flow-through entity 
will create large differences. So, you have a whole host of unjustified 
differences in the international context, and, in other contexts, you will 
find that people are going to be taxed differently depending on whether 
they are employees or independent contractors, whether they are doctors 
or health clubs, whether they are partnerships or whether they are 
corporations. 
The distinctions that this Act alone has produced mean that it really 
needs to be rethought in a systematic, comprehensive way going forward. 
This law is an invitation to everyone to say: “Yes, this is an improvement” 
or not. It is not always an improvement, but in the international area, on 
balance, I think I would rather have it than what came before. 
On the other hand, there are many opportunities for improvements 
going forward, and I do hope that groups like this and all the students I 
see in the room will take this opportunity and begin to assess the tax 
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reform of 2017 relative to its goals and then evaluate potential 
improvements that might be made and create the kind of intellectual 
background that is necessary for Congress to act when the moment 
comes—which I am optimistic, just to ring an optimistic note—when 
Congress is ready to act in a sensible and thoughtful and bipartisan 
manner. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: I do share the frustration that this panel 
expressed, but I do not share targeting it at treaties. Maybe they have to 
be updated, but I view treaties as a good and beneficial thing. This may 
be evident in that the current administration has no problem terminating 
international agreements when they deem them not good, but tax treaties 
are not on the list of international agreements that the administration 
wants to terminate, and the question is why. I think it is because there are 
benefits. 
PROF. SHAVIRO: We were wondering if the administration knows 
what international tax treaties are. 
PROF. GRAETZ: One answer is that President Donald Trump does 
not know anything about them. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Let us give them the benefit of the doubt. I have 
been thinking about the benefits of treaties. One benefit is fiscal 
cooperation. I do not think anybody would disagree with that. 
Another thing is that treaties do signal some legal stability that 
business needs, and I say “signal legal stability” because they can be 
terminated, but they are there still. Yes, I agree with Rebecca that the 
stated purpose of treaties is a bit weird because, yes, definitely we can 
avoid double taxation unilaterally.220 We do not need treaties for that. 
But, I view the substantive purpose of treaties as more of an 
instrument that facilitates the inoffensive, non-uniform allocation of 
taxing rights. You can just tax different items of income of different 
residents or residents of different countries differently without offending 
anyone. Good luck doing that statutorily. What would you say? That 
Germans are taxed less than French? It will not fly, I think. So, there is 
that. 
To go back to the legal stability point, treaties provide some 
framework that is based on negotiation that takes into account the tax 
systems of both countries, and when that balance is distorted by radical 
reform, we have a problem with treaties. Maybe the purpose is, again, 
within the context of legal stability: “Okay, there is a limit to what we can 
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do in terms of reform without amending treaties, and if we want to do 
something radical, let us all think about it together and find a way to do 
that.” 
Back in the day, this was hard to do. Renegotiating treaties could 
take a lot of time, but the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(“Multilateral Instrument” or “MLI”) introduced a much faster way of 
renegotiating treaties. I am not worried about this concern anymore. There 
are provisions in the new Act that have treaty problems. You think about 
those and you say, “Okay, what is happening here, and what is the United 
States doing?” 
I do have a problem with unilaterally doing something against 
treaties, especially when the Treasury introduced two new model 
provisions in the 2016 U.S. Model Treaty that the OECD talked about 
before: the Special Tax Regime (STR) and subsequent change in law 
provisions. The new provisions essentially say that if treaty partners will 
reform their systems such that they will unilaterally allow nontaxation, 
we are going to basically suspend the effect of treaties until we negotiate 
better treaties that would address the concern or until the treaty partner 
changes their own laws. 
That tells you something. Yes, it addresses the issue of nontaxation, 
but the concept is there: “We do not like unilateral acts that are in conflict 
with the spirit of treaties,” and what the United States is doing, on the 
other hand, is exactly that. 
The BEAT is the main provision with which I have an issue.221 To 
me, the BEAT is a clear violation of the treaty. Others might disagree, but 
it certainly has treaty problems, and it is a unilateral step that is 
completely inconsistent with the Treasury’s approach of being against 
unilateral steps like that. With regard to the problems that Rebecca 
pointed out, I do not attribute them to treaties as much as I attribute them 
to politics.222 
PROF. GRAETZ: Fadi, if the United States were to say that there 
was a limit, for example, on the amount of royalties that could be 
deducted—to avoid the nondiscrimination problem that you raise—by 
both the United States and a foreign multinational, is that something that 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2226 (2017)(to 
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would be, for you, an unfortunate unilateral act, or is that simply a way of 
protecting the U.S. tax base? 
PROF. SHAHEEN: So, you are saying we are limiting the 
deductibility of certain payments without regard to who the recipient is? 
PROF. GRAETZ: I do not have to worry about it if they are 
domestic. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: That is the nondiscrimination issue, right? 
PROF. GRAETZ: I am only worried about it if they are abroad 
because that is when you are going to get them out of the U.S. tax base if 
they are in the U.S. tax base. I can write that rule in a way that would not 
be violating the nondiscrimination rules. I do not believe that the BEAT 
violates the nondiscrimination rules, but if it does, maybe it is a treaty 
override of some sort. We have done that before.223 
My question is: how are you intending to constrain U.S. unilateral 
action, or how do you view treaties as appropriately constraining U.S. 
unilateral action? Especially given the fact that we see the European 
Union, the Germans, the United Kingdom, the Australians—I can go on, 
but I will not—the Koreans, the Indians engaging in unilateral action?224 
PROF. SHAHEEN: My criticism is not focused only on the United 
States. I do not like what is going on globally, and I think everybody 
should sit down as adults and figure out a way that is beneficial to 
everybody. I think that is what Susie is saying. 
PROF. MORSE: But they do not need to sit down. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Okay, fine. Let the market do that? 
PROF. MORSE: That is right. There has been something happening 
unilaterally that sets that up. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Let us terminate the treaties. We cannot benefit 
from them when we like them and then go against them when we do not 
like them. Why not terminate the treaties, then? 
PROF. GRAETZ: We have done that before. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: I know we have done that before, but Congress 
did not express an intent to do that this time, and that is a problem. 
                                                                                                                 
 223. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (holding that when an act 
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 224. U.S. Companies Urge EU to Refrain from Unilateral Moves on Web Tax, 
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PROF. GRAETZ: The problem, though, is that the U.S. Congress 
can override treaties under the U.S. Constitution225 with the last in time 
rule that governs, you know this well, and, to take a contrary example, the 
French cannot.226 The French treaty holds. So, that gives us a little edge 
in overriding treaties. I understand the point in saying that maybe we 
should not take advantage of that edge, or maybe it is not fair for us to 
take advantage of that edge. 
PROF. SHAVIRO: Because once other countries know we are doing 
it, that is going to affect their— 
PROF. GRAETZ: They can terminate the treaty when they want to 
if they feel like it has become imbalanced. 
If you are worried about the loss of the U.S. tax base (royalties on 
intellectual property is my favorite example), I am worried about 
intellectual property royalties, why can I not stop it if I am the United 
States? I should be able to stop excessive deductions for royalties paid 
abroad, and I should not have to renegotiate bilateral treaties with every 
country around the world in order to stop that. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Why is the United States complaining about 
what other countries are doing? 
PROF. MORSE: What I cannot figure out is why other treaty 
countries would complain about this Act. I do not understand that. It 
seems to me that what the Act does is it protects the corporate tax bases 
of other countries. Why would they fuss about it? I just do not understand 
that piece of it. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: I do not think countries— 
PROF. MORSE: And if they do not complain about it, then are we 
not okay? 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Susie, countries— 
PROF. MORSE: Also, Lee has a question. 
QUESTION [Lee Sheppard, Tax Notes][off-mic]: No, it is not a 
question. They are complaining because their banks are going to have to 
pay tax on the BEAT. 
PROF. MORSE: With regard to the BEAT, is it confined to banks? 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Sheppard]: It is mostly banks. 
PROF. MORSE: Mostly banks. My understanding of the BEAT had 
been that it would shelter most regular deductions, because it allows up 
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to half of your otherwise taxable income before you get to BEAT territory, 
but I understand— 
AUDIENCE [off-mic]: Because you do not get the credit, though, if 
you have any serious GILTI, that ends up not being true because of the 
cliff. Once you are in BEAT. Before that, it is fine. 
PROF. MORSE: Once you are in BEAT, it is bad. Agreed. 
QUESTION [Danielle Rolfes, KPMG][off-mic]: But, if you just go 
over three percent, I understand the rationale about what they are doing 
and the fact that the rate is only ten percent, and I had the same first 
reaction— 
PROF. MORSE: The point is a deduction-stacking point. I would 
have thought that you stack all the deductions to say high-tax countries 
first—those are business frictions, you keep those—and the ones that get 
eliminated so that you can avoid the BEAT are the ones paid to the low-
tax or tax haven jurisdictions. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Sheppard]: If you are a bank, it is a two percent 
ceiling, and you are paying and paying and paying to related parties all 
the time. That is what you do. 
PROF. MORSE: The bank point—I understand that. I am not sure 
on the nonbank issues, but I have much to learn, I think. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Rolfes]: We could talk, but, for one thing, it is 
not as simple as just giving up deductions. There is a real question under 
the law about whether you can just give up deductions. So, you are talking 
about: “I will keep my deductions for the good countries, and I will give 
up my deductions to bad countries,” and you cannot do that. 
PROF. GRAETZ: Meaning, you just would not claim the deductions. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Rolfes]: Yes, yes. And that is not— 
PROF. GRAETZ: The big problem that you all are talking about with 
the BEAT, just to be clear for the people in the room who are not as 
familiar as you are with it, is that it does not allow a credit for any of the 
foreign taxes that you pay. That is the big problem with the BEAT. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Rolfes]: Which means that if more than three 
percent of your deductions are to related persons, you lose all your credits, 
and that seems like a legitimate concern. 
PROF. GRAETZ: Exactly, but that is why I raised the question the 
way I did, which is to say that if what you really are arguing is that income 
is U.S.-source income because the related-party deductions for royalties 
are too high, you should disallow those deductions because they are too 
high. This is what you would do under transfer pricing if you could do it, 
right, if you thought they were overstating U.S. deductions. Then, the 
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problem is that the foreign country should not be imposing a tax on those 
royalties, and they should be giving credit for the U.S. tax. It is a 
complicated question. 
The problem with the BEAT is that the BEAT was created because 
Congress had enacted the GILTI to deal with outbound base erosion. They 
needed to do something for inbound base erosion. The excise tax in the 
House bill did not work, so they came up with this idea about which 
nobody had thought or vetted, which came out of Congress in three weeks 
and has huge problems. 
The question that I would ask is whether you want to try to save the 
BEAT by amending it or whether you want to ask what are you worried 
about in terms of U.S. base erosion and start dealing with deductions that 
are eroding the U.S. base or about arrangements, maybe cost-sharing 
arrangements, that are eroding the U.S. base directly. That seems to me 
to be the right question that this legislation has posed. 
I am not taking a position on what the answers should be because I 
do not know the answers to that question, but I do think—and this goes 
back to your point, Fadi—that there is no reason on earth that our treaties 
should prohibit us from doing that. We should be able to decide that issue. 
We should not be able to dramatically overtax income that belongs 
to another country. If we do that, then they are going to start saying, 
“Well, we are going to terminate our treaties,” or “We are going to do 
something to you,” or “We have to go back and renegotiate,” or you all 
go to the bargaining table because what they are likely going to do is 
overtax U.S. companies, starting with digital services and going well 
beyond that. 
This is an ongoing process, but I think the question that you are 
raising and where your disagreement and Rebecca’s becomes stark is, 
how much should we be bound by the treaties that we now have? My 
answer, I think, is somewhat, but not when we are seeing our base eroded 
the way that I think our base has been eroded by both U.S. and foreign 
multinationals. 
QUESTIONER [Ms. Sheppard]: The BEAT is not the only thing we 
did about royalties. We did a whole mess of things around royalties. 
PROF. GRAETZ: I know, I know. It is enough to talk about the 
BEAT. 
QUESTION [David Rosenbloom, NYU]: I finally had to come out 
of my chair. The treaties, whether we like them or not, are the supreme 
law of the land. What Michael is saying is that we could override the 
treaties, which is constitutionally certain. We could do that. But denying 
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the deduction—what you suggested with respect to royalties, we have 
actually done in the 2017 Act with respect to interest. 
What we did—I think, correctly—is we denied deductions for 
interest in excess of thirty percent of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
(EBIT) or, for the next three years, Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA). This is interest paid to 
everybody, payments to U.S. people, payments to foreign people. Clearly, 
we can do that. 
It sounded to me, however, as though you were suggesting denying 
a deduction just for payments to foreign people and not to U.S. people. 
We cannot do that. To me, that is a blatant violation of what we have 
agreed to in the nondiscrimination clause.227 We may not like it, but that 
is what the nondiscrimination clause says. 
I have a little bit of a story. I remember dealing with the Australians 
many years ago. For twelve years, the Australians refused to enter into a 
treaty with us because they would not sign a nondiscrimination clause. By 
the way, there is still no normal nondiscrimination clause in the U.S.-
Australia treaty.228 It is a government-to-government agreement. 
I was thirty-seven years old and I said to John O’Reilly: “That seems 
very unreasonable. We have a nondiscrimination clause with everybody. 
Why do you not agree to it?” 
He said: “It is real simple. We want to discriminate.” He paused for 
a second, then said: “And so do you.” 
You know, he was right. We have discriminated repeatedly, starting 
with the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA),229 
Section 884,230 Section 367(e),231 and Section 163(j).232 We have always 
had an excuse as to why this is not really discrimination. Section 882-4 of 
the Treasury Regulations, in which deductions are denied if you do not 
file a return on time, only applies to foreign people.233 You would think 
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that is discrimination, but no—the Internal Revenue Service has come up 
with an argument that it is not discrimination.234 
Let me finish one thought, which is I agree with you that you could 
do what we did in Section 163(j). You can clearly pass something that 
limits the royalty deduction if it applies to everyone. What I thought you 
were saying is that we might pass a royalty limitation that only applies to 
foreign people. That is a violation of the nondiscrimination clause, in my 
judgment. Assume it is—we can override the Nondiscrimination Article 
in the treaties. It is possible constitutionally to do that.235 
The problem is that the price to be paid for that kind of action is 
going to be paid by our multinationals.236 I do not believe the rest of the 
world will sit still while the United States systemically repudiates its 
treaty commitments. We may not like those treaty agreements. I agree 
completely with Rebecca that the modern treaties are way out of sync, 
and that has been true for years. But, we need treaties—we have no means 
of resolving international tax disputes otherwise. What are we going to 
do? Face the world alone? That is beginning to sound awfully familiar to 
me. 
Facing the world alone is not something we want to do in the tax area 
because there are other countries out there that have serious interests. 
They will retaliate, and not against the U.S. government. Instead, they 
will retaliate against U.S. companies, and, I believe, notwithstanding all 
the influx of investment in the United States, in the multinational world 
there are a lot more of us than there are of them, and we will pay a price, 
a big price. 
PROF. KYSAR: I will just say briefly I am not against treaties; I am 
just against these treaties. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: But they need to be updated. 
PROF. KYSAR: Yes, and I think the fundamental allocation of 
taxing jurisdiction needs to be revisited. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Can I still say a couple of words, or are we out 
of time? 
PROF. GRAETZ: You can say something. I just want to respond to 
one thing David said, which is that Section 163(j) applied to U.S. tax-
exempt entities as well as to foreigners as a way of avoiding the 
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nondiscrimination clause.237 If you want to do that with my royalty 
provision, I am happy. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Just to add to what David said and to follow up 
on the point you made, Michael, yes, it is possible constitutionally to 
override treaties, but the Supreme Court decided long ago—and that 
decision is still good law—that you cannot override treaties without 
expressing a clear intent to override.238 
This did not happen in this Act, and there are good reasons for that 
Supreme Court decision. One of the reasons a clear intent to override the 
treaties is required is because we want to make sure that Congress 
considered the implications of overriding treaties, and the concerns—for 
example, that David raised—are clearly ones that should be taken into 
account. Not expressing such an intent to override implies that Congress 
did not consider the implications and concerns, and that is a bad thing. 
On the foreign tax credit point: that is not a violation of the treaty. 
That is not even a conflict. The BEAT does not give foreign tax credit, 
but also it does not deny foreign tax credit.239 There is a reconcilable 
inconsistency with the treaties, and the law on that is very clear. You 
reconcile the treaty with the statute,240 and it is very easy to do that: you 
allow a treaty credit. 
I have not heard anybody saying that there is, and I cannot think of, 
any policy reason not to allow foreign tax credit against the BEAT. 
Luckily, we have the treaties to do that. David and I wrote about this, and 
I stand behind that.241 What the statute did is to say there is no Section 
901 credit.242 It did not say, “credits are not allowed.” 
Okay, fine, no Section 901 credit. But, when there is a treaty in effect, 
the treaty gives you credit, and you can give foreign tax credits without 
any conflict and without any problems there. It is not an override question 
here at all. That is on the foreign tax credit part. 
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Here is a way to think about treaties in a positive way. I think we are 
lucky to have them in this respect. Maybe in other respects, yes, they are 
outdated, but let us renegotiate them and not unilaterally go against them. 
PROF. KYSAR: As a policy matter, I agree with you that it would 
be great to have foreign tax credits against the BEAT—I do not see why 
that came out the way it did—but, as you know, I disagree with you about 
the lay of the constitutional law. It is something I am writing about, so I 
will not take much time, but it is coming in the online Columbia Journal 
of Tax Law.243 
Basically, when I look at that case, Cook v. United States,244 which 
is what you are referring to, I see that as applying to a very specific set of 
facts. Essentially, the Court there was interpreting the reenactment of 
statute that preceded a later-enacted treaty.245 In those rare circumstances, 
I think it could inferred that Congress’s intent was not to override the 
treaty, but I do not think that Cook stands for a general proposition that 
Congress must expressly override a treaty before it effectuates an 
override. 
Instead, I think if there is no foreign tax credit in the statute, then that 
is an expression of Congress’s will to override the treaty, even though it 
does not mention the override in the legislative history. But, I know you 
and I disagree about that, and we can take that to maybe another 
symposium. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Just one second on your reading of Cook. The 
Supreme Court dealt with Cook later on—the last time being in 1984 or 
so—and they read it completely differently than what you said.246 That is 
the law. And even if it were bad law, it is still the law. 
PROF. KYSAR: In recent years, Congress has overridden treaties 
without expressing its intent, and there has been no Court that reverses 
that—but, again, we can take it to the law review pages.247 
PROF. SHAHEEN: I wanted to say other things, but my time was 
well-spent differently, so it is fine. 
PROF. KYSAR: Let us take a five-minute break, and we will 
reconvene since we are running late. Thank you. 
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PANEL II 
PROF. COLON: Welcome back. We are going to start the last panel 
now, and our first speaker will be Stephen Shay from Harvard. 
MR. SHAY: I am going to touch on only two of the points that I 
planned on discussing, as some of the other topics have been adequately 
discussed. I am just going to focus on convergence of tax rates and how I 
think the law works in a respect that is a little different. I will come back 
to the deficit and sustainability at the very end. 
First, regarding convergence. I put together some numbers some 
time ago. For this part of the discussion, the top half of this number set 
are what we think of as peer countries, and the bottom half are what we 
think of as low-tax or enabling low-tax countries. 
In each case, there have been substantial reductions in tax rates. 
Whenever you look at Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) data,248 it helps to know what really goes on in the 
country. For example, I put two asterisks next to Switzerland. This is 
taking the relevant federal rate and the relevant average cantonal rate. 
Nobody that I know of actually operating in Switzerland pays twenty-one 
percent—and if you have, you can come see any practitioner in the room, 
because Switzerland has special regimes that allow you to implement a 
much lower rate. Those regimes are now in the process of being amended 
                                                                                                                 
 248. See, e.g., OECD Data, https://data.oecd.org/ [https://perma.cc/LUN9-TE75] 
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Convergence of tax rates and foreign tax credit (FTC) implications




2014 ETR of CFCs 
(FTC/Cur. E&P) *
Selected Trading Partners
Canada 42.43% 26.80% -15.63% 14.55%
Germany 51.61% 29.83% -21.78% 18.46%
Japan 40.87% 29.74% -11.13% 23.28%
United States 39.34% 25.84% -13.50% --
Selected Low-Tax Countries
Ireland 24% 12.50% -11.50% 3.10%
Netherlands 35% 25% -10.00% 7.50%
Switzerland** 24.93% 21.15% -3.78% 7.74%
United Kingdom 30% 19% -11.00% 7.71%
OECD Tax Database - Table II.1 dataset (6-18-18).  * Author calculations based on 2014 IRS Statistics of Income for profitable CFCs. ** Does not take 
account of companies eligible for special tax status, proposed to be repealed, or proposed tax reforms and rate reductions.
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out of the law under pressure from base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS).249 That is a reminder that all of these rates are going to change as 
countries implement BEPS and as the European Union’s Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive (ATAD)250 is implemented. 
We are in an incredibly fluid tax environment right now for carrying 
on a global business. I would caution all of us who are trying to draw 
conclusions at this stage about the effect of this Act, in part because there 
are so many moving pieces in other parts of the world. 
The last column—and, again, take this data with a grain of salt—was 
simply my taking the foreign tax credits that were shown as paid by 
country in 2014 statistics of income (SOI) data for the universe of 
profitable CFCs over the total earnings and profits of CFCs reported for 
that country. I view this SOI actual tax data as the best data. But, these 
effective rates are for countries as a whole. In our peer countries, not 
surprisingly, they are well below the statutory rates that you get on the 
left-hand side, but they are nontrivial. In the bottom half of the slide, they 
are much lower—particularly for Ireland. There is a lot of noise in those 
numbers, but it is important background to understand the U.S. law 
changes. 
What does this tell us? It tells us that the effect of the Tax Act was 
to bring our headline rates much closer to the rates of the rest of the world. 
That is no surprise, but it is a very big deal. I want to emphasize something 
that Rosanne said: going to a twenty-one percent corporate tax rate affects 
a lot of different margins, and that is something on which we want to keep 
an eye. 
Today I am just going to focus essentially on Global Intangible Low-
Tax Income (GILTI).251 If you have a controlled foreign corporation 
(CFC) and it carries on foreign business, what happens under the Tax Act? 
Just to show you how much I am learning, I presented a version of these 
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slides earlier this week, and they have already been changed because I 
learned something between Monday and today, and that is the way I view 
our understanding of this Act. It is a very dynamic situation. 
First, this slide is saying, “What is your order of application in a 
sense of the statute?” If you have Subpart F income—any Subpart F 
income—it dominates, in a sense, your deemed tangible income return, 
which is an exception from GILTI and dominates GILTI. What I had not 
focused on until somebody pointed it out is that, even if you have Subpart 
F income, there is an election that treats something as outside of Subpart 
F if the effective foreign tax rate in relation to that Subpart F income 
exceeds ninety percent of the U.S. rate; this is why you are going to see a 
funny number later in these slides, 18.9, or ninety percent of the U.S. rate 
of twenty-one percent.252 If your effective foreign tax rate is higher than 
18.9%, you can elect out of Subpart F and into exemption.253 
The other thing to which I am going to come back is that, in my 
professional experience, you can also create Subpart F income. We tend 
to think, “Oh, Subpart F, it is what it is.” It is not. I can make it when I 
want it; I can avoid it when I want to avoid it. And if I have a high enough 
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 253. Lowell D. Yoder, Subpart F High-Tax Exception: Impact of Recent Foreign Tax 
Credit Legislation, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 4, 2011), https://www.bna.com/subpart-
hightax-exception-n17179888952/ [https://perma.cc/ZV5L-ZSCT]. 
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foreign tax rate, then I can elect out of Subpart F. That is important, and 
that is one piece of the enormous complexity of this Act because there is 
so much electivity. 
Again, this part of our discussion is assuming we are servicing 
foreign customers through a foreign corporation, and that it has some 
qualified business asset investment, on which you earned your ten percent 
return. 
Foreign tax credits. If you have deemed tangible income return and 
it is exempt because of the dividend received deduction (DRD), you 
cannot have foreign taxes associated with that income now or ever. I do 
not think they stay in a pool—they go away. 
If you have GILTI, you also have the twenty percent haircut on 
GILTI foreign taxes as was mentioned earlier. If you have Subpart F 
income on which you are being taxed currently, you pay the full twenty-
one percent rate instead of the GILTI effective 10.5% rate, but you get to 
credit all of your foreign taxes. Also, you get to cross-credit taxes if you 
happen to have other general-basket foreign-source income. Passive 
income is always separated for credit purposes. 
Now, we come to the fun stuff. 
I tried to create a table in the middle of this slide. If you have a 
foreign effective rate on income of less than 13.125%, a number you 
heard earlier today because that is grossing up 10.5 for the twenty percent 
haircut on foreign tax credits, then you would rather have exempt income 
because anything under that effective foreign rate means you will have 
some residual GILTI inclusion. Your second choice would be GILTI, and 
Subpart F, NDTIR, GILTI and FTCs
Variations in Foreign Tax Credit Limits














NDTIR - Exempt (DRD) 0% NA NA 0% NA (None)
GILTI 80% SL Yes 10.50% None
Foreign branch 100% SL Yes 21% 1 and 10
General category income
Sub F and other FSI 100% CC Yes 21% 1 and 10
  Foreign-source FDII 100% CC Yes 13.125% 1 and 10
Passive (w/high tax kick-out) 100% SL Yes 21% 1 and 10
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the last choice would be Subpart F because it is taxed at twenty-one 
percent. 
I can usually avoid Subpart F, so, keeping that in mind, it creates 
some marginal incentive with a low enough foreign tax rate to have 
foreign tangible investment. If I am in this next range between 13.125% 
and 18.9%, GILTI and exempt income are the same at that point, and it is 
only Subpart F that I want to avoid. 
I have decided that I should change the arrow in the next category 
from deferred Subpart F to net deemed tangible income return (NDTIR). 
High-tax Subpart F that still is taxed at less than twenty-one percent (i.e., 
between 18.9% and 21% effective foreign rate) for which I elect out of 
Subpart F is the same as and does not dominate NDTIR. So, I have been 
editing slides yet again as I go along as I have been learning more. 
If your foreign effective rate is over twenty-one percent, then you 
may actually prefer Subpart F because you have no residual U.S. tax. It is 
wiped out by the foreign tax credit. But, you get to carry over your credits, 
and you do not lose them. Again, this table may be the most useful thing 
in this whole package for some people in the room. You need to look at 
whether you get the credit, whether it is limited separately—I am going 
to ignore the expensing column for the moment—what is the tax rate you 
are paying on it, and, only then, can you understand the value of a credit 
and where you want to come out on that. 
I do less practice and more writing now, so take all of this with a 
grain of salt, but I am keen to hear from the practitioners whether there 
are things in here about which I am actually incorrect. 
“It’s the tax rate, stupid.” FTCs and tax planning
• Foreign taxes drive planning:
1. Reduce foreign taxes as much as feasible.
2. CFC planning into income categories based on effective foreign tax rates after 
allocation of US expenses for FTC purposes:
FTC Eff. Rate Order of Income Category Preference
< 13.125% NDTIR → GILTI → Subpart F
13.125% - 18.9% NDTIR or GILTI →  Subpart F
18.9% - 21% Deferred Subpart F → NDTIR or GILTI → Subpart F
>21% Subpart F → NDTIR or GILTI
• Note that these categories effectively are blended at the shareholder level, so these 
effective rates are blending of a US shareholder’s positive earning CFCs.
• Review the effective foreign tax rates in Slide 4.  There likely will be some 
increases in the lower foreign effective rates because of ATAD 1 and 2 and foreign 
country responses to BEPS and some reduction in higher foreign effective rates 
because of statutory rate reductions.
2019]     THE FUTURE OF THE NEW 285 
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
Now, I am going to put this together. All I have done in this slide is 
show how these rate breaks compare with the old effective rates from the 
2014 Statistics of Income (SOI) data. You will see there are a lot of 
countries in the bottom half of this slide that are below 13.125%. 
I do not see any reason from the change in our law why the 
aggressiveness of trying to reduce foreign taxes will change. That is my 
big takeaway from this slide. As long as I want to beat foreign taxes below 
13.125%, I am going to continue to do the kind of international planning 
to be sure I am below that rate. 
If you think it is easy to calibrate foreign taxes to within a percentage 
point or two, you have not done real-world taxes. For one thing, I may 
have an audit adjustment that may push it up. There are all kinds of things 
to consider. You have to leave a lot of leeway around both edges of 
whatever margin in which you want to maintain your foreign taxes. 
I want to be in the seven percent range if I have confidence to be 
below 13.125%, especially if, as any legitimate reading of the law will get 
us, we are going to have allocation of domestic expenses against that 
income because then the effective foreign rates from a U.S. perspective 
are going to be much higher. Once we get to real allocation of expenses, 
general and administrative (G&A), and interest, we are going to have 
quite high foreign effective tax rates. That is another takeaway. 
FTCs and tax planning – From Slides 7 and 4
FTC Eff. Rate Order of Income Category Preference
< 13.125% NDTIR → GILTI → Subpart F
13.125% - 18.9% NDTIR or GILTI →  Subpart F
18.9% - 21% Deferred Subpart F → NDTIR or GILTI → Subpart F
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I hope that is useful, but I also think it is important to understand how 
the Act actually works in order for us to then step back and say what is 
going to happen in the future, what do we want to change. 
I am not going to discuss Foreign-Derived Intangible Income (FDII) 
because I do not think we need it. I am going to skip the foreign tax slides 
to make a few observations at the end of the deck and hand the panel on 
to my next colleague. 
The sustainability issue is that there is a real possibility that income 
tax rates will increase. If you listen to some things that were said earlier 
today, that spoils a lot of hypotheses. The hypothesis that expensing is a 
good thing is not correct if your tax rates go up. You are getting your 
deduction at twenty-one percent, and your later income is going to be 
twenty-five percent. 
It is not a good thing if you plan on having FDII and effective rates 
increase because they are going to reduce or take away the deduction. But, 
deficit pressure means that if I am planning into these things—expensing, 
FDII, GILTI—am I going to count on those deductions being around as 
they are advertised to be? I am not so sure. 
We have talked about convergence of rates. The big issue is that the 
payoff from tax planning has been reduced by moving down to the 
twenty-one percent U.S. corporate rate. That is a very dominant effect. 
Even though I have emphasized the planning we can do, it is all planning 
under a twenty-one percent rate. It is just not that important, I am sorry to 
say. We will all be employed, but our compensation may have to be 
reduced. 
I have talked about credits. Lowering the rate and these crazy limits 
bring us back to the still substantial pressure to keep foreign taxes down. 
I do not see a meaningful change of this dynamic between old law and 
this law. 
Then, there is a crazy incentive to put tangible investment outside 
the United States if I can keep my foreign taxes down. Why? Because I 
still get a depreciation deduction—not expensing, but 168(g). I get a ten 
percent exemption return. Plus, I never have a U.S. rate above 10.5%. 
That is a substantial potential tax benefit. 
That is it. The last point on my slide shows us that this Act has made 
America great again. Thank you. 
PROF. COLON: Thank you. David Rosenbloom from NYU. 
MR. ROSENBLOOM: I tried to answer the question that I thought 
was implicit in the conference, which is the future of the new international 
tax regime, so I am focused on what actually happened. 
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I will go right to the core of the matter. I think this is all a bunch of 
hokum. It seems to be a generally accepted notion in this room that the 
2017 Act was a vast improvement over prior law and, frankly, I may be 
the only dissenter. There are improvements in the Act, but a significant 
portion of this statute strikes me as quite irrational. This statute would 
have been improved with about a year’s further reflection before it went 
public. 
One of the first items I want to discuss is that the TCJA statute 
substantially rejected three items that have been in tax law in the United 
States for nearly a hundred years. It strikes me that these items were 
dismissed with very little recognition and very little discussion. 
First, as a statutory matter, the abolition of Section 902 significantly 
diminishes the role of the foreign tax credit. Second, GILTI operates 
without an earnings and profits test, which results in a situation that is—
to my way of thinking—slightly nuts. 
There is an increasingly famous example in the new GILTI 
regulations in which, with actual income of 100, the taxpayer is required 
to include 200 in income. A foreign corporation earns 100 net and the 
U.S. shareholder includes 200. That flows—logically, I am told—from 
the fact that there is no earnings and profits concept in GILTI. GILTI 
depends solely on income. We have precedent for this in the passive 
foreign investment company (PFIC) rules, but GILTI is a much bigger 
operation, and is more important, than PFIC; it applies to many more 
people. 
Third, nobody has specifically mentioned that GILTI, like Section 
965, operates by ignoring the separateness of entities, which is something 
that we have always had.254 There have been some exceptions but, 
generally speaking, we do not combine deficits in one controlled foreign 
corporation with positive income in another. That creates large-scale 
technical problems. 
There are certainly errors in the statute. There are also weird policy 
choices and illogical consequences—BEAT, in particular. Let me spend 
a moment on this because some people have praised BEAT. BEAT is an 
irrational statute. It has at least three characteristics that are truly bizarre. 
                                                                                                                 
 254. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) 
(to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 951A). 
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First, BEAT applies when the income received by the recipient is 
fully subject to U.S. tax.255 You have a deduction for a payment to a 
related foreign person, with full U.S. tax, and the BEAT still applies. That 
is crazy, but that is the way it works. A payment from a U.S. person to a 
foreign taxpayer is fully taxed because the payment is effectively 
connected with the U.S. trade or business-there is no relief from the 
BEAT on that, and that is a realistic example.256 Many foreign banks are 
in precisely that situation. 
Second, people say the BEAT is wonderful because it addresses all 
of these base erosion deductions—but, in a noncredit world, you can have 
fifty-two percent of your income offset by base erosion payments and 
have no BEAT liability.257 Fifty-two percent is a broad tolerance. 
The third bizarre characteristic of BEAT is that you can have a very 
low base erosion percentage—enough to trigger the statute, which is three 
percent generally, two percent for banks—and you could owe hundreds 
of millions of dollars in tax because of the denial of the foreign tax 
credit.258 
I think those three aspects of the BEAT are very strange. 
Additionally, there are certain things that are carved out of the 
BEAT, such as qualified derivative payments and this fight that is 
occurring regarding transfer pricing for services subject to the services-
cost method.259 These items are rejected from being base erosion 
payments, but they are thrown out of both the numerator and the 
denominator in the base erosion percentage.260 For some people, that is 
going to leave a base erosion percentage that reflects only the residual 
deductions, which could be much smaller. Think of how many payments 
may go out as qualified derivative payments. They could be a large 
percentage of the payments for a financial institution. You will have a 
base erosion percentage that only depends on the rest. 
                                                                                                                 
 255. See generally John DerOhanesian & Kimberly Majure, INSIGHT: Fundamentals 
of Tax Reform: BEAT, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.bna.com/insight-
fundamentals-tax-n73014482752/ [https://perma.cc/QSY9-VQFM]. 
 256. Proposed regulations would rectify this oddity by extra statutory fiat. 
 257. See generally FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, FASB STAFF Q&A TOPIC 740, NO. 
4: ACCOUNTING FOR THE BASE EROSION ANTI-ABUSE TAX, (2018) 
https://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=Document_C&cid=1176169883520&d=&pa
gename=FASB%2FDocument_C%2FDocumentPage[https://perma.cc/J2W2-PBYM]. 
 258. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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The problem here with the BEAT is that there is no connection 
between the modified taxable income base and how you get there. In other 
words, the penalty for being in the BEAT is not connected with the base 
erosion focus of what throws you into the BEAT. I will stop with that 
because I could continue to discuss the BEAT for a long time. 
Two sets of regulations have emerged thus far: one under Section 
965, which is the repatriation provision, and another under the GILTI 
rules of Section 951A. 
What we are involved in now are micro-technical issues, and there is 
a lot of money that turns on them. One of the things that happens as a 
result of Section 965 is repatriation. For the first time ever, we are 
swamped with previously-taxed income. Because of the Section 965 
rules, a significant number of multinationals have millions, or hundreds 
of millions, of dollars of previously taxed income (PTI), and the 
preexisting rules on PTI are having a hard time under that pressure; they 
were not sufficiently developed to deal with this situation. 
Because the new rules are augmenting the old rules, we must 
examine sections of the Code on which we never spent enough time, such 
as Section 961, with which people are discovering all sorts of problems, 
the basis rules under Subpart F. The rules were adequate as long as we 
encountered Section 961 issues only occasionally—but now, everyone is 
going to encounter Section 961 issues frequently throughout the system, 
and there are many unanswered questions. 
Another area in which you will encounter issues is with regard to 
Section 962. How many Section 962 issues were there in the past? Not 
very many. But now, because the entire statute treats individuals as 
forgotten taxpayers, we have people asking: “Well, what about Section 
962? Can I use Section 962 to claim the GILTI deduction?” The answer 
may well be no. 
There is a lot of pressure on Code sections that have been with us 
since 1962 about which  nobody spent a lot of time thinking before, and 
Congress did not spend a lot of time thinking about them in drafting this 
statute. 
Finally, just to cap it all off, we have an entire Code section that is 
very familiar to international people—Section 956, investment in U.S. 
property261—but no one quite knows what its function is under the new 
law. What is that statute doing there? Marjorie Rollinson at the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) called it an “attractive nuisance” at an NYU 
                                                                                                                 
 261. 26 U.S.C.A. § 956 (West 2018). 
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conference last year. I think that is a good term. Nobody seems to know 
why it is there. 
The statutory situation may result in instability. That instability is 
matched by worldwide instability because I think BEPS has set off a 
chaotic series of actions in other countries. To me, it is hard to make long-
term plans on the basis of this statute. 
That brings me to the Treasury. The Treasury is charged with making 
sense out of all this, but the General Counsel’s Office in the Treasury does 
not like straying too far from the statutory language. Because the statutory 
language in certain places does not make any sense, the Treasury is 
hamstrung in trying to make this all work. 
The question I have is how far the Treasury can go to be a hero here. 
The one place where we are going to see this dynamic is in the question 
of allocating and apportioning domestic deductions against the GILTI 
foreign tax credit limitation. To me, it is clear from Section 904(b)(4) that 
you need to allocate and apportion deductions. That is old, black letter, 
law. 
That is the single biggest issue right now under this statute. Will there 
be an allocation and apportionment of deductions against the GILTI 
basket? I predict that the Treasury definitely will come out with that. I 
think there will be fierce lobbying to get Congress to change it. Watch 
that space; this is a big issue. 
A secondary, but still significant, issue is how do you determine what 
is deductible from the income of a CFC and, in particular, do the new 
Section 163(j) rules, which limit the interest deduction, apply at the CFC 
level? There are a lot of issues like that lurking around, and the question 
I ask is: how far can the Treasury go? 
I will point out one interesting thing that nobody has mentioned: it is 
not quite true that, in determining GILTI, you take up to ten percent of 
your tangible assets off the top as exempt income and then everything in 
excess of that amount is tested income and potentially GILTI. The ten 
percent tangible return is reduced by allocable interest, and that is a big 
number potentially. In the newest GILTI regulations, the Treasury 
essentially made a gift to taxpayers. The statute says that you take into 
account all interest expense that is apportioned against tested income in 
the hands of a CFC, except to the extent that that interest expense is 
matched by tested income in the hands of the interest recipient. This 
means that the only interest expense not taken into account to reduce the 
ten percent return is interest expense matched by tested income that may, 
in turn, be GILTI for the U.S. shareholder. It is a huge gift for the Treasury 
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to say you take all interest allocated against GILTI and net it against 
interest income before applying the result to reduce the ten percent return. 
Think about a CFC that has interest income and interest expense only 
to unrelated parties. Under the statute, all interest reduces exempt income 
except for interest to related parties that is tested income in their hands. 
The Treasury is allowing taxpayers to take into account interest income, 
and to subtract only a net negative result from exempt income. This results 
in more exempt income from Qualified Business Asset Investment 
(QBAI).262 
A taxpayer wants a return on tangible assets that is as high as 
possible. The statute envisions that there will be a lot of interest allocated 
against it.263 As far as I am concerned, the Treasury has contravened the 
words of the statute in saying that netting is allowed. 
Thank God we have the Internal Revenue Service, right? Because 
they will clean all this up since we have geniuses out there administering 
the laws. 
I think this is the big unspoken weakness of this statute. To me, the 
statute looks to be highly unadministrable. As I have asked in other 
settings: what could go wrong with four foreign tax credit baskets, 
including two new ones and thousands of pages of regulations? Nobody 
has talked about what the implications of foreign adjustments are for 
BEAT or GILTI. There are not going to be any of those, right? Foreign 
countries are not going to adjust the income of U.S. multinationals. 
Another point—which is a point that I would like to talk about, but I 
do not have any time to go into it—is if we keep cutting the budget of the 
IRS, what difference will the rules make? There is nobody around to 
administer the law. 
The statute is one surprise after another—all dependent on the facts 
of specific taxpayers. There are some remarkably formidable provisions 
in the statute. You can increase your export income by adding to your 
non-export income, which is an odd result. There is an article on that by 
one of my colleagues called The Nitty-Gritty of FDII,264 which is very 
good regarding the problems with FDII. 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See generally Guidance Related to Sect. 951A (GILTI), 83 Fed. Reg. 196 
(proposed October 10, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 263. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 951A(b)(2)(B) (West 2017). 
 264. See generally Jonathan S. Brenner & Josiah P. Child, The Nitty-Gritty of FDII, 
TAX NOTES (Sept. 17, 2018), http://www.capdale.com/files/24250_the_nitty-gritty_of_ 
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If you find yourself unexpectedly in BEAT territory without a 
foreign tax credit, it is a cliff effect. If you exceed the credit by two or 
three percent, you could end up with huge liability. 
Finally, how is the rest of the world going to react to this? Potential 
World Trade Organization (WTO) challenges have already been 
mentioned.265 Somebody is going to say that FDII is an export incentive, 
and I agree. 
There will be copycat rules out there. Other countries may say, “Hey, 
GILTI looks pretty good to me,” but perhaps on a per-country basis. 
The big thing about GILTI that people have to realize is that GILTI 
implies a great deal of averaging, including CFCs positive and negative, 
CFCs being netted against one another, or QBAI from one company being 
used against tested income in another company. This creates a great 
incentive to send investment outside the United States because averaging 
always produces an incentive to go outside the United States. If you are 
low, you have an incentive to average up by going outside the United 
States; if you are high, you have an incentive to go abroad to bring the 
average down. 
I asked previously: is it really in the interest of the United States to 
trade leadership in international taxation for outlier status? 
My final point is, what has really happened with the TCJA? In my 
opinion, the statute leaves us with two things that have enduring value. 
First, the lower corporate rate is the most important aspect of international 
taxation. We have lowered it to twenty-one percent, and I cannot see us 
increasing it anytime soon. We may need to do it for budgetary reasons, 
but we are not going to increase it dramatically. The other real game 
changer here is GILTI. With a few strokes of a pen, GILTI could result in 
the end of deferral as we know it. We may be forced into that. I think 
many people realize that GILTI was a dramatic change in the rules. 
This statute contained twenty-seven provisions in the international 
area; we have focused on only a few of them. There are some good things 
in the rest of these international provisions that nobody has mentioned, 
such as new material in the transfer-pricing area266 or the anti-hybrid 
                                                                                                                 
 265. See generally Ivana Kottasová, Does Tax Overhaul Violates Global Trade Rules: 
Europe Thinks So, CNN (Dec. 19, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/19/news/ 
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 266. 26 U.S.C.A. § 482 (West 2017) 
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rules.267 But, generally speaking, I do not believe that this statute, as we 
have come to understand it, is sustainable. It has too many problems, it is 
not administrable, and it lacks widespread support. Thank you. 
PROF. COLON: We will hear from Danielle Rolfes next. 
MS. ROLFES: Thank you. I feel lucky to be here with this esteemed 
group. When I was invited, I wondered what I could contribute to the 
academic discourse on the TCJA? Because I was working in the Treasury 
Department when President Obama developed a minimum tax,268 I think 
I can best contribute to this panel by focusing on the Obama 
Administration proposals, and what the thinking was behind the 
development of particular aspects of those proposals in the Green Book. 
The Green Book is what we call the President’s budget, where he sets 
forth his proposals for new fiscal laws.269 I am talking about proposals 
that we made several years ago.270 
When I saw Rosanne’s speech on the agenda, I wondered for a 
moment whether we might be redundant, because we each worked with 
Harry Grubert in developing our work on minimum tax.271 After listening 
to Rosanne’s very informative talk, we will certainly not be redundant 
because Rosanne is an economist.272 I am a tax lawyer, and we have 
different perspectives and ways of talking about the proposals coming out 
of the Obama Administration. 
                                                                                                                 
 267. 26 U.S.C.A. § 267A (West 2017). 
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 269. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 
REVENUE PROPOSALS, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/ 
general_explanation.aspx [https://perma.cc/7EUC-D7YH] (last visited Mar. 20, 2019). 
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The reason that I think my perspective on old proposals is still 
relevant is that our current version of GILTI is not sustainable. As David 
pointed out, the OECD is talking about minimum taxes. This is surprising 
to me, because when I represented the Obama Administration at the 
OECD, and we were working on the BEPS imperative, the United States 
advocated for a minimum tax, asserting that a CFC-based approach could 
be part of the strategy to address BEPS. I think it was Rosanne who said 
that you can be more targeted in a CFC-type regime to address the 
behaviors that you do not like. 
We were laughed out of the room. The United Kingdom was 
completely opposed to endorsing really any CFC regime for the reasons 
we are all familiar with.273 If a country tries to solve base erosion by just 
taxing subsidiaries of companies with parents located in that jurisdiction, 
you end up with an inversion problem, or the problem of foreign 
companies potentially being more attractive bidders for your companies 
so that the United States would never win the jurisdictional choice for the 
parent company following a business combination. 
That is a problem with minimum taxes. It could be a risk with GILTI. 
I do not think it is a significant problem for GILTI—but if you start 
expanding its impact, as would have been the case under the Obama 
Administration’s proposal, you need to consider whether you have 
entered into that territory. 
At the OECD, this conversation is now somewhat serious. I think 
Germany is the primary advocate of taking a minimum tax-style approach 
to address the base erosion and profit shifting concerns that remain for 
some countries following BEPS.274  Germany has advocated for pairing 
any new minimum tax with a source-based defensive measure to try to 
address the inversion issue. For example, the source-based defensive 
measure could deny a deduction to companies that make an otherwise 
deductible payment to a related person located in a low-tax jurisdiction if 
the ultimate parent of the recipient does not impose a minimum tax regime 
on foreign subsidiaries. 
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The idea at the OECD currently seems to be: “We could implement 
minimum taxes as part of our solution to BEPS, and we can deal with 
countries that do not adopt such a system by denying deductions for 
payments to companies that are not subject to such a regime.” So, the 
OECD may be taking a cue from BEAT. This would then make other 
jurisdictions think: “What would be better for my companies—to be 
subject to a minimum tax or to be subject to the harsher measure of having 
deductions denied?” 
It is also interesting to note that the United States has pivoted to 
advocating for a different proposal at the OECD, which is focused on 
increasing market-based taxing rights as a way to address some of the 
income shifting that I think the minimum tax is trying to address. 
Nonetheless, this is a long way of saying that I think the minimum tax 
proposal developed during the Obama Administration is still relevant 
because the OECD is considering once again the optimal design features 
of an effective minimum tax. 
In designing the Obama minimum tax, everyone agreed from the 
outset that we were going to end lockout by taxing income either 
immediately or not at all. I do not think that is controversial. 
The way we talked about the minimum tax, and what everyone has 
said here, was that it is not worldwide versus territorial—it is something 
in between. We talked about the rate as a “split-the-baby” approach to the 
two common ways of measuring efficiency, capital export neutrality, and 
capital import neutrality. Because you can never reconcile both at the 
same time, we recommended establishing a compromise rate for the 
minimum tax in order to “split the baby.” This phrase is the best 
explanation of the thinking process behind the policy. The economists 
talked about it that way, and the tax lawyers talked about it that way. We 
were splitting the baby. 
Why were we doing that? We did not care about foreign-to-foreign 
base erosion, at least not for the sake of any foreign government’s coffers. 
That was not our goal—we were not trying to be the world’s policeman 
by enforcing taxing rights for other jurisdictions—it was not about 
making sure Germany collected its tax bill. 
Two things are important, however. First, we did not think we could 
reliably distinguish U.S. base erosion from foreign base erosion. If a 
company can strip income out of Germany into a haven, it makes shifting 
income from the United States to Germany more attractive. Accordingly, 
we did not think we could write rules to reliably distinguish U.S. base 
erosion from foreign-to-foreign base erosion. Second, we believed that 
296 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
taxation of foreign earnings at the full U.S. rate would make U.S. 
multinationals less competitive, and we did not seriously consider going 
there. Once you accept those two premises—that no- or low-taxed foreign 
earnings are correlated with U.S. base erosion, but it would be 
uncompetitive to tax foreign earnings at the full U.S. rate—from there, it 
is just a question of where to set the compromise rate. There were many 
in the Office of Tax Policy who did not think the nineteen percent rate 
that President Obama ultimately proposed was the right rate in terms of 
balancing those concerns, but that rate was settled on as the opening 
negotiating position, and you saw where that went.275 
Importantly, we did retain Subpart F. The Obama Administration 
made a deliberate choice to retain Subpart F as a regime that would trigger 
tax at the full U.S. rate instead of at the compromise rate.276 The view was 
that Subpart F, properly tailored, was focused on acute U.S. base erosion. 
And that it made sense for the income of an invoicing company that is 
just stripping distribution profit out of the United States—or for a royalty 
that is paid to a CFC holding company for IP that is being used in the 
United States—to be taxed at the full U.S. rate rather than at the 
compromise rate. I imagine this reasoning may have been part of the 
decision to retain Subpart F as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
(TCJA),277 although there is complexity in doing that.278 
I will say that Subpart F was originally enacted to also address 
foreign-to-foreign base erosion, not simply to address acute U.S. base 
erosion. The check-the-box regulations, however, had the effect of largely 
turning Subpart F off for a lot of foreign-to-foreign base erosion. In 
enacting section 954(c)(6),279 Congress embraced this idea that Subpart F 
should just be focused on U.S. base erosion. The Obama Administration 
would have made section 954(c)(6) permanent as part of any reform based 
on the view that the minimum tax, the compromise rate, was the 
appropriate way to address foreign-to-foreign base erosion. 
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There is a lot more you could do with Subpart F to focus it on acute 
U.S. base erosion. Subpart F takes a country-by-country approach, which 
sometimes causes subpart F income that cannot be ameliorated by check-
the-box or section 954(c)(6). It has been suggested, “Why not treat all 
foreign countries as one country if you really are trying to make Subpart 
F just be about protecting the U.S. base rather than foreign-to-foreign?” 
When we were working on the Obama proposals, we just did not get to 
that level of fine-tuning, which I think is also an explanation for a lot of 
the choices that were made in the TCJA. 
We have talked a lot about the ten percent return on QBAI, and I do 
not think I am going to say anything that has not already been said here, 
but I will say it a little bit differently. The Obama Administration proposal 
would have given a return based on a measure of Treasury rates, a risk-
free rate, on all investment in active assets. That is, a return on all of your 
invested equity in the company. 
There were a number of policy reasons the Treasury economists 
thought about it that way. It was not a ten percent rate—which many 
people have suggested is too high—but it was also not limited to tangible 
assets. If the minimum tax is really trying to get at profit shifting from 
excess returns attributable to intangibles, which most have focused on as 
being the source of profit shifting, then you have to consider: “If you buy 
a patent, the first dollar of income that you earn from that patent you 
purchased is not an excess return.” It did not seem right to us to focus 
exclusively on depreciable property. Instead, we provided an exemption 
from the minimum tax for a fixed return on all active assets.280 
I take Rosanne’s point that the ideal way of exempting a normal 
return would be through expensing. I learned from Harry Grubert that 
expensing only does that if you refund the net operating losses (NOLs). 
Maybe you get close enough to giving a current benefit for NOLs in a 
worldwide tax system when one CFC’s losses are permitted to offset 
another CFC’s income, but we were designing a country-by-country 
system, so that was not the case in the Obama version. We were not 
refunding the losses, so I do not think we could have said that we were 
giving an exemption on a normal return by simply implementing 
expensing. 
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Instead, the Treasury economists stated that providing a fixed return 
on the invested capital is the next best thing, even though we had to 
substitute our own generally applicable rate for a more tailored, company-
specific rate, which expensing uniquely would have accomplished. 
I now turn to the idea that giving any exemption on tangible assets 
located abroad gives an incentive to locate assets abroad. My perspective, 
however, is that companies do not relocate actual activities abroad in 
order to save taxes on the normal return from those activities. My 
experience as a tax planner is consistent with this, and all of the 
companies and advisers who came into the Treasury Department 
complaining about our proposals consistently stated this. What has been 
wrong with our tax system is that it encourages companies to locate actual 
activities abroad, not because of any favorable tax treatment for the 
normal return on those activities, but rather because the conduct of those 
activities abroad opens the door for taxpayers to avoid tax on intangible-
related returns associated with the activity. 
Take our Subpart F system, for example. You get an exception from 
Subpart F if you actually manufacture in the jurisdiction. As long as you 
manufacture in the jurisdiction, all the intangible-related return associated 
with the manufactured product can escape U.S. tax.281 It is those kinds of 
rules that give companies an incentive to shift assets and activities abroad. 
Of course, exempting the normal return on actual investment enabled 
us to say that we had a territorial system—at least for some sliver of 
income. It was important to most in the tax reform debate to be able to 
say that there was this token of territoriality. It also turned out that it did 
not cost very much under the Obama proposal. Because we were doing a 
country-by-country minimum tax, and most investment in active assets 
tended to be in high or medium-tax countries (reinforcing the point that 
those investment decisions were not driven by tax rates), the modeling 
suggested that there would not have been much minimum tax imposed on 
earnings attributable to the countries where the assets were located. Of 
course, check-the-box planning had nonetheless made it possible for 
investment in any country outside the United States to facilitate the 
shifting of intangible returns to low-tax countries. 
Because we were not focused on the normal return from these 
activities, but rather on the excess returns that we believed were indicative 
of profit shifting, we thought it made sense to exclude from the minimum 
tax an appropriate rate of return on actual investment in active assets. We 
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structured that tax-free rate of return differently than the TCJA’s approach 
of allowing a ten percent return on QBAI. 
Honestly, in my experience, I think this is all a bit of noise. Ten 
percent may exceed the normal return and in that sense be too high, but I 
do not think that is the biggest or even on my top-ten list of things that are 
wrong with GILTI, but I am sure it is going to be a stalking horse 
politically, so it may change. 
I was an advocate of the fifteen percent haircut in the computation of 
the foreign effective tax rate (ETR) that was included in the Obama 
proposal,282 and I did not realize I had a fan in Dan Shaviro until later. 
The origin of that aspect of Obama’s proposal was actually Senator Max 
Baucus’s proposal.283 
Senator Baucus proposed a version of splitting-the-baby that was not 
a minimum tax. He proposed instead to impose U.S. tax on sixty percent 
of CFC income and allow only sixty percent of the CFC’s taxes as foreign 
tax credits.284 That is not a minimum tax because there is no rate above 
which you do not owe U.S. tax. A company would always owe residual 
tax under that approach. 
When the Treasury looked at it, though, we liked the fact that it gave 
companies an incentive to lower their foreign taxes. Again, we were not 
trying to get companies to pay foreign taxes. Instead, we wanted 
companies to have some skin in the game on this question. There is a rule 
in the code that says, for a foreign tax to be creditable, you are supposed 
to first “exhaust all practical remedies” to not pay more than you owe.285 
The IRS has difficulty enforcing that rule. There is also a rule against 
countries enacting soak-up taxes,286 but countries could still enact tax 
holidays that would be geared to set the rate at the minimum rate but no 
higher, based on a view that companies would be neutral to paying a tax 
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up to that amount. We wanted to make sure companies had some skin in 
the game. 
I will turn now to discuss the Obama Administration’s decision to 
propose a country-by-country approach for measuring the foreign 
effective tax rate, with the result that the top-up tax would be imposed 
whenever the earnings in a particular country were subject to foreign tax 
at a rate below the minimum tax rate. GILTI, of course, is different 
because it allows companies to effectively mix earnings from low-tax 
countries with those from high-tax countries in determining whether 
residual U.S. tax is owed. 
I recall that Harry Grubert suggested in a paper he wrote with 
Rosanne that a fifteen percent country-by-country tax would be 
equivalent in terms of revenue raised to a twenty percent overall tax.287 
What we got in the TCJA is a 13-1/8 global tax. For the vast majority of 
companies, of course, their foreign effective tax rate exceeds 13-1/8—so, 
on the margin, GILTI is not going to make much of a difference in terms 
of the base erosion incentive to shift income out of the United States’s 
twenty-one percent environment into a tax haven, unless and until such 
shifting would cause the overall foreign rate to drop below 13-1/8. 
Because the Obama Administration was focused on the incentives for 
U.S. base erosion at the margin, including for companies that had some 
high-taxed foreign earnings, it ultimately decided to go with a country-
by-country approach. 
Of course, companies responded to the Obama proposal that a 
country-by-country regime would be overly complex, and there remains 
a question about whether that complexity is warranted. Some advisors 
also asserted that the ready availability of hybrid instruments would make 
such a regime impossible to effectively implement. The suggestion was 
that companies would use hybrids to shift income from a low-tax 
jurisdiction into a high-tax jurisdiction solely for U.S. tax purposes such 
that the transferred income would not be included in the high-tax 
jurisdiction’s tax base. The income would only have been shifted from 
the perspective of the United States. 
In response, we wrote two rules in the Green Book which appeared 
to address the concern, and which curtailed the suggestion that a country-
by-country minimum tax would be gamed by hybrids. Thus, I think that 
policymakers could write rules to address hybrids if they wanted to 
implement a country-by-country tax. 
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For the students in the room, the new law is not a minimum tax. 
There is no foreign rate above which you do not owe residual U.S. 
tax. That is, in part, because of the requirement to apportion expense U.S. 
shareholder level expenses to foreign source income, but there are some 
other reasons, too, and I will turn to expense allocation in more detail 
shortly. Before I get there, I will say the Obama Administration proposal 
was fundamentally different in that it was only a “top-up tax. As a result, 
you would test the foreign effective tax rate for earnings in a country, and 
if the foreign ETR in a country was above our rate, the income never came 
onto the U.S. return. We relied on old law about what is a creditable tax 
to determine the foreign taxes that would be considered, and I am sure a 
lot of the foreign tax credit rules would have been implicated in running 
this foreign ETR test. It certainly was not simple, but this approach was 
generally more favorable to taxpayers because they did not have to rely 
on the ability to claim a foreign tax credit on their U.S. tax return in order 
to not owe additional U.S. tax when the foreign ETR was sufficiently 
high. 
We also thought it was important to have some smoothing in this 
system over time. Under prior law, we had foreign tax credit carry-
forwards that allowed for some smoothing if the foreign base was 
different than the U.S. base—for example, due to timing differences in 
when income and expenses are recognized. Because the Obama proposal 
would not include that mechanism, we thought it was important to replace 
it with something, so we proposed to determine the foreign ETR based on 
a rolling five-year weighted average. It is a little better and fairer, but in 
this brave new world of rough justice, you could probably get rid of that 
aspect of the Obama top-up tax and nobody would even notice. 
GILTI is not a minimum tax, for quite a number of reasons. 
The compromise rate for GILTI is not a scheduler tax system. It is 
not, in fact, a lower rate. It is achieved through a deduction, and the 
deduction is not available if the company has overall losses, like from its 
U.S. activities or from its branches, such that its total taxable income is 
less than its GILTI and FDII. 
If total taxable income is less than GILTI plus FDII, then the income 
that is available for the FDII or the GILTI deduction gets scaled down. It 
is not just that your deduction is limited by taxable income. If you have 
an overall loss, you will lose part of your GILTI deduction, and you will 
lose it forever. It does not make a great deal of sense that, if we enter a 
recession such that more companies have losses, all of a sudden, that will 
be the moment that the appropriate foreign effective tax rate on CFC 
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earnings is twenty-one percent because no deduction is available to 
companies with overall losses. That is kind of nutty. 
I should also note that there are no foreign tax credit carry-forwards 
under GILTI. Of course, no taxpayer can claim a foreign tax credit in a 
year when they do not have taxable income. That is, you do not get a 
foreign tax credit if you do not have tax on your U.S. tax return against 
which to claim that foreign tax credit. In this recessionary scenario, then, 
my loss companies could be taxed on their foreign income at an effective 
rate of twenty-one percent if they are offsetting that income with U.S. 
NOLs, and get no foreign tax credit. So, twenty-one percent U.S. tax, and 
it is all just double tax because there is no foreign tax credit. I am sure the 
foreign jurisdiction is not amused by any of this. 
That is just nuts and seems incredibly counter-cyclical. I assume that 
the first stimulus proposal that we will get in the recession is to undo all 
of this. I have asked people on the Hill, “Why did you use a deduction 
subject to a taxable income limit?” They respond: “Oh, there are just 
different ways to do it. We could have done it as a rate. We could have 
done it as a deduction. We just had to pick among the different ways.” 
Wow. One might have hoped for a more satisfying explanation of such a 
draconian policy. 
Now, let me turn to deductions. The Obama Administration proposal 
matched the treatment of deductions with the income. Under the proposal, 
if a CFC’s income was exempt—because of active investment in the CFC, 
there is income that is never going to be subject to U.S. tax—the Obama 
proposal denied the U.S. deduction for the interest that was allocable to 
the activity. The Obama proposal took this approach to avoid subsidizing 
the exempt income by taxing it at a negative effective tax rate. In addition, 
if income was subject to the minimum tax, the deduction was haircut to 
equate to the U.S. rate at which the related income was taxed. Thus, we 
matched everything. If the income was taxed at twenty-one percent, you 
got a twenty-one percent deduction. The deductions were effectively 
scheduled based on the rate at which the income was taxed. Our goal was 
to be neutral on foreign activities by allowing deductions at the same tax 
rate as the related income. 
There is no hint of that in the TCJA.288 They did not deny any 
deductions for expenses allocable to exempt income. Recall that back in 
the early Camp days, the proposals only provided for a ninety-five percent 
dividend received deduction (DRD) to implement a territorial system. The 
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other five percent was described as a proxy for the fact that there would 
not be a disallowance of deductions. The Obama Treasury Department 
was not convinced by that proposal because ninety-nine percent of the 
time five percent was not going to be the right number, and it was also 
not the right average. I think the overall statistics suggested that the right 
average was something more like eight percent, which, again would not 
be the right percent for the vast majority of taxpayers. 
I think it was a good decision to not retain a disincentive to repatriate 
through a small residual tax of five percent. I think that was a great 
simplification, and I loved that they went with a one hundred percent 
DRD.289 But, the TCJA only deals with expenses in a backhanded way. 
The TCJA did not provide for any express expense disallowance until you 
get to the foreign tax credit limitation for GILTI. Because GILTI is not a 
minimum tax and is instead implemented through the foreign tax credit, 
all of our old rules about allocating expenses for purposes of determining 
the foreign tax credit limitation apply. Under those rules, if a company’s 
foreign ETR is above 13-1/8, every dollar of expense that is allocated 
against the GILTI basket costs twenty-one cents. 
For companies whose foreign ETR is above 13-1/8, TCJA is 
effectively denying the deductions allocable to GILTI, assuming the 
company could have otherwise claimed the foreign tax credit because 
they are not in a loss. But then, oddly, for a company with a foreign ETR 
sufficiently below 13-1/8, maybe because all its foreign operations are in 
Cayman, it gets to keep its deductions at a full twenty-one percent rate. 
Such a company might be paying some GILTI tax, a little top-off, but at 
a rate below twenty-one percent, and they still get twenty-one percent 
deductions. The Obama Green Book made a different policy choice—to 
match the treatment of the deductions to the income. This is all in the 
context of making revenue choices and determining how you want to raise 
revenue. 
I think the Treasury is now considering whether to give some relief 
on expense allocation; we do not expect it to be complete, but they might 
give some relief. It is interesting in that it gives back some of those 
deductions for the high-tax taxpayers. I am not disagreeing with that 
policy choice in the context of a statute that was passed with a legislative 
history that said, “companies will not owe residual tax for CFCs with a 
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foreign ETR above 13-1/8” and that did not expressly disallow deductions 
such that the Cayman company gets all their deductions. I cannot make 
any sense of it. 
For the most part, my colleagues have focused more on the 
incongruities, where it is just fun to make fun of the bill, and I have tried 
to talk more about the policy choices. I cannot help but start to go there 
now. 
The economists—this was all Harry, I never understood how we 
would make it work—wrote the rule in the Obama proposal to address 
dispositions of stock. They said it was imperative to avoid creating 
incentives to retain or sell assets to ensure that when you sell an asset, the 
gain on the sale is taxed the same way as the income from the asset would 
have been taxed had it been retained. You should have the same treatment 
either way. Therefore, we proposed that the rate of tax on a sale of stock 
should be a composite rate based on the extent a CFC’s underlying assets 
give rise to income that is subject to the minimum tax, the exemption for 
the normal return, or the full-tax Subpart F regime. 
The TCJA does not say anything about that.290 They basically left out 
of the new “quasi-territorial system” dispositions of stock gains; so, 
unlike other countries that have a participation exemption—which 
generally also extends to the treatment of dispositions of stock—the 
TCJA does not say anything about that. Of course, if you sell a CFC with 
retained earnings, you get to treat that as a dividend, but to the extent there 
is built-in gain (i.e., appreciation) in the assets, that portion of the gain or 
loss presumably would be taxed (or result in a tax benefit) at a twenty-
one percent rate. If it is a loss, that would be good. Economists would, of 
course, say, “that means there is an incentive then to hold onto gain assets 
rather than sell them.” Enter the tax planners: no one is going to do that. 
We just trigger the gains before you sell the assets, and then the gains can 
be taxed as a 10.5% rate. 
I do not give them much grief for the lack of branch-versus-CFC 
parity. I think it was hard to treat branches like CFCs. We would have 
wanted to have parity in Obama, but there is a difficult issue about 
transitioning branches to being treated as CFCs, and I think some of the 
complexity around having a new branch basket, new recapture rules, is 
that it was a reasonable attempt to try to wall off branches to limit that 
optionality, so I do not give them much grief for that. 
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I suspect a minimum tax is part of our future, for better or worse, 
because incremental change tends to be the name of the game. I think that 
we will get changes to our minimum tax, and it will become tightened 
probably over time because of the deficit reasons that we have discussed 
today. That puts a lot of pressure on residence rules and having a 
residence-based taxing system, and it does seem like it might be worth it 
for Congress to revisit residence rules and try to provide a little less 
optionality. 
I would note that our 2006 Model Tax Treaty—in the context of the 
limitation on benefits article—includes a real management-and-control 
test for residence.291 We know management and control in Europe can just 
mean where you golf once a quarter, but our 2006 Model has a template 
for how you would write a real test for where a company is actually 
headquartered. I think the provision is also in the U.S.-Dutch Tax 
treaty,292 which is why you do not see inversions to the Netherlands. The 
C-Suite would actually have to move to the Netherlands, and it turns out 
that is not as attractive as it sounds to the tax lawyers. Revisiting the U.S. 
test for corporate residence is not something the Obama Treasury really 
thought about much. 
Picking up on a theme from earlier, I think a minimum tax is a 
halfway solution to the idea that we cannot directly protect the U.S. base, 
and I do think more should be done to shore up the U.S. base. 
I do think our treaties are problematic in that we have given up 
source-based taxation in situations where the income on the other side is 
not subject to tax, and that creates wild incentives to overstate the income. 
I am intrigued by the idea of revisiting the debate on what is the right 
model treaty for the United States, and even thinking about subject-to-tax 
requirements on the other side. Although such a rule may be 
inadministrable, so there are reasons we have not done it before. 
PROF. COLON: Thank you. Richard Phillips from the Institute on 
Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP). 
MR. PHILLIPS: First, I want to say I am so very happy to be here. 
To a lot of the folks that were on the panel before, and even this current 
panel, your work has informed what I have been doing for a long time, 
and I have learned a lot today, so I wanted to mention that. 
Just to start out, because I am not like a lot of the other panelists—I 
am not a professor; I am not a lawyer. I guess there was one economist 
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and then a lot of lawyers. I want to mention what ITEP is.293 We are a 
nonpartisan research and advocacy organization, but we do have two big 
principles in mind: adequate revenue and a fair tax system. That informs 
how we look at things, and you will see how that works. 
I think there are two big things for which we are known. One is our 
tax incidence analysis. We have a micro-simulation model that is very 
much in line with the Joint Committee on Taxation and also with the Tax 
Policy Center. I think what also makes our model unique is that we can 
do state-level analyses. When Governor Cuomo, for example, proposed 
the “millionaire’s tax,” we were able to say, “here is how it impacts folks 
in New York.” 
The other thing that makes us unique is that we are the ones digging 
into a lot of the 10-Ks and a lot of the reports. There is not a lot of great 
information—which I will talk about later—but, to the extent that there is 
information, we are the ones coming up and showing that a lot of these 
corporations, such as General Electric or Verizon or Boeing, are not, in 
fact, paying much in taxes. 
The last thing I should mention is that we are part of the FACT 
Coalition, which is the Financial Accountability & Corporate 
Transparency Coalition, which has a lot of different focuses, but one of 
the focuses is cracking down on tax havens and working on international 
tax issues.294 The proposals I am talking about today are what we have 
been pushing over the past few months in Congress. 
I will go through this quickly because we have already talked a lot 
about how the previous system was broken, but I just want to underline 
how we think about it. The way we saw it before was that we were losing 
about $100 billion in revenue from the previous system, so when we think 
of international tax reform or what should have been, we see that there is 
$1 trillion over ten years that we should be getting back. What ultimately 
happened was that we actually lost $14 billion more. 
What I would have liked was a system that actually raised a 
substantial amount of money instead of losing a little bit, so we obviously 
did not end up in a great place. Then, the Congressional Budget Office 
said, “To what extent did we crack down on tax avoidance?” They said 
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that we cracked down maybe by about twenty percent.295 They had said 
that there was about $300 billion worth of profit shifting. Now, they are 
estimating about $235 billion, which is about a twenty percent reduction. 
The last thing I will say before jumping into our recommendations 
on how to deal with this would be to say I think it is important to 
emphasize why we are talking about this: (1) I think it is important to have 
a fair and efficient system and one that really makes sense; but (2) we are 
talking about revenue. We are trying to raise money to pay for things, and 
every dollar that we lose to international tax avoidance means higher taxes 
on other things—so, you have to raise taxes on businesses, you have to 
raise taxes on individuals. It means higher deficits, or it means cuts to 
spending. That is why we are talking about this. 
If you come up with a new rule that loses a lot of money on the 
international side, you have to make that up somewhere, and we think it 
is important to make it up on the international side. 
There are three big principles. I will spend a lot more time on the 
first one, but there are three principles we have been pushing on how to 
fix: 1)equalize the rates, 2) eliminate corporate inversions, and 3) create 
transparency. I will go through each of these. 
What do I mean by “equalizing the rates?” In a big-picture sense, I 
think the problem that we have right now is that if a company is deciding 
where to put either its intangible income or, in many cases, its tangible 
investments, we want it to be so that if you have a choice between building 
a factory in Indiana or building it in Ireland or anywhere else, you would 
choose Indiana; or, at least, we do not want you to have a tax incentive to 
put it in Ireland. 
How do you equalize the rates? Basically, we would eliminate a lot 
of deductions; so, we would eliminate the ten percent deduction for 
offshore assets, which is how GILTI is defined.296 Although I am 
surprised to hear a lot of people do not think this is the worst provision, I 
still think it is the worst provision because you have this bad incentive. I 
will be interested to see how the numbers work out as soon as more 
companies release this information because some folks have been saying 
they do not think there is going to be a lot of this income. I looked at a 
handful of companies, particularly manufacturers, who are the ones we 
are concerned about politically because they are moving factories. I saw 
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that they do get a big tax break on the back end, but I will be interested to 
see more data on that. 
The second thing would be to eliminate the fifty percent deduction 
on GILTI. Instead of having a 10.5 rate, you should have a twenty-one 
percent rate. That way, you have an equal rate either way. One thing about 
which we have been talking to lawmakers is the fact that the Obama 
Administration’s tax had a minimum tax of nineteen percent and a top 
rate of twenty-eight percent.297 We talked to one lawmaker, and they said, 
“Well, why do we not do the Obama proposal and keep the current rate?” 
I said, “At the point at which you are at nineteen percent minimum tax, 
you might as well just do the twenty-one percent and have it be even.” 
That is the way we have been looking at it. 
One of the other two smaller things that are also important is that I 
think you would need to eliminate the break for Foreign Derived 
Intangible Income (“FDII”). This does not seem to be that effective. We 
are not hearing about lots of corporations moving their intangible income 
back to the United States—it is simply not effective in that regard. I think 
it is more of a windfall way of losing a bunch of money and not getting 
anything out of it. Again, as Danielle talked a lot about, we would apply 
the U.S. tax rate on a country-by-country basis. This has been one of the 
things that has gotten the most attention from lawmakers when we talked 
to them or staffers when we talked to them. They seem to like this idea. 
Second, I think we need to eliminate corporate inversions. I think 
this is important for two reasons: (1) it is self-serving because, as part of 
a comprehensive package, what I am proposing would create a real risk 
of companies expatriating, so you need some ways to crack down on that; 
and (2) I think it is something that is low-hanging fruit that should have 
been done. I do not understand why they did not put some of these 
provisions in their new code. Maybe they figured that it is the Democrats’ 
job to take care of that. But I think you need to put those final pieces in 
there. For example, we even saw Dana Holding, an auto parts supplier, is 
doing an inversion under this current system. So, I think you need to take 
the low-hanging fruit. 
I divide the ways in which you can eliminate inversions into two 
buckets. One is what was in the Stop Corporate Inversions Act,298 which 
had more to do with the definition of a foreign company. You put in these 
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management-control provisions about which we have talked. Also, if the 
company is held by a majority of the same U.S. shareholders once they 
do a merger, then they still should be considered a U.S. company. 
The second bucket is ways in which foreign companies are 
advantaged over U.S. multinationals. I think it would be good to crack 
down on that in general, but I think it is a disincentive to invert. You need 
to curb deductibility of excess interest payments. I would go along with 
the Obama proposal. You get some of this by cracking down on interest 
payments in general, and you get some of this in the 385 regulations.299 I 
think it would be good to have it as a permanent part of the code. I have 
a continuing worry that they will just strip that out of the regulations, so I 
would like it to be part of the code. Also, I think it should be stronger. 
The other thing that I would look at along these lines would be 
enhancing the BEAT.300 I guess I am on the team of: “I really like the idea 
of the BEAT.” I think it needs to be reformed to include costs of goods 
sold; this would be a big piece in fixing it. 
Finally, one thing that has not been mentioned, which is something 
we would like to see in the future system, is to require public disclosure 
of country-by-country financial information. I think one of the things that 
underlies a lot of the discussion we have had today is that we do not have 
a publicly available system of looking at how much companies are paying 
or where their payments are. In many cases, the companies themselves, 
or the accounting firms, know what they are doing and have a lot of 
opinions about it, but the public does not. 
In many cases, when we have these high-profile cases of tax 
avoidance like Apple, it is because the U.S. Senate subpoenaed a 
company and forced them to do that. We should not depend on Senate 
subpoenas to figure out what is going on with the international tax system, 
so I think it would be good to have a public debate. But, I also think that 
there is momentum behind additional disclosure in the realm of corporate 
taxes, as opposed to other areas of corporate disclosure—it is just a 
question of how much additional disclosure will be required. 
The reason that additional disclosure is likely to happen is because 
investors have been pushing for this for a while because they, over the 
past several years, have had lots of big surprises. You have cases where, 
to use Apple again, suddenly the investors did not know that there was 
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going to be a $14 billion charge for the European Commission,301 and 
maybe if they had had some information showing that $100-and some 
billion had zero tax on it, they would say, “Well, there might be a tax risk 
there.” 
There are numerous other examples like Facebook302 and 
Caterpillar,303 over and over again, where suddenly investors are not told 
that there is this huge tax risk. I think some additional information 
definitely is going to be disclosed. Right now, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board is going through a whole review process of looking at 
income tax disclosures.304 We have been pushing for full country-by-
country reporting to be required, but, at a minimum, I would expect them 
to break out more foreign tax and foreign income, which is what their 
latest draft proposal said.305 
The last piece of this about which I was going to talk, and getting to 
the theme of the conference is, what is the future? Right now, I do not 
think you have seen too many proposals from Republicans so far. I would 
be interested to see what their proposals are. I think a lot of their focus 
has been on the regulatory piece of it and on defending the current system 
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because it is hard to immediately reform the tax system and then 
immediately say we messed up and here is a lot of legislation to fix it. 
The Democrats have had several different proposals that fit in with 
the outline of proposals through which I have just gone. The most 
comprehensive is the No Tax Breaks for Outsourcing Act from 
Representative Lloyd Doggett and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse.306 I will 
note that this one in the House has seventy-seven co-sponsors right now, 
so it is not a fringe piece. It is getting a lot of attention in the House.307 
What it would do is eliminate the fifty percent deduction on GILTI, 
eliminate the ten percent deduction on offshore assets, take a run at 
curbing the inversions, and eliminate the FDII as well.308 The idea is to 
try to shift to an area where we will have more equal rates and curbing 
inversions. 
The second piece of legislation is the Close Tax Loopholes that 
Outsource American Jobs Act, which eliminates the fifty percent 
deduction on GILTI.309 
Finally, the Per-Country Minimum Act by Representative Peter 
DeFazio sets the GILTI break to match the FDII rate, so it just raises the 
rate a little bit.310 But, more importantly, it does take a stab at applying 
this on a per-country basis. 
Although I think there is still some work we need to do on filling in 
the details of how it will work, conceptually, the idea is to rebuild the 
GILTI into an Obama minimum tax. For additional information, I have a 
longer report on all this.311 
PROF.COLON: I wanted to comment on a couple of things that have 
been addressed. Everyone here has said that it is unstable. My view is that 
we should give it a shot. 
I think Rosanne says, “we should get some data, even if after a few 
hours of reflection, people here can find some huge holes in this.” My 
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view is that I think they are going to be fixed in some way or another and, 
of course, all legislation can be improved. It took us thirty years to get 
here, so I think waiting and seeing how it works out and trying to 
obviously make some administrative changes can improve the outcome. 
Ultimately though, we know it is going to have to be done legislatively 
because the problems are too profound. 
Another thing which people have started talking about is that this Act 
gets rid of any pretense of taxing similarly investment returns earned 
through different legal entities. Almost all of the benefits for foreign 
source income—the GILTI deduction, the DRD, and the foreign tax 
credit—are limited to U.S. corporations. 
If you look into the legislative history, you do not see why everything 
has to be run through a U.S. company. If you want to operate as a pass-
through—there is no one here raising their hands for the venture capital 
(VC) people—but there are large closely held companies in the United 
States that do a lot of business abroad. It seems ridiculous to me that they 
have to consider running everything through a C-corporation in order to 
get the benefits of the fifty percent deduction or the DRD or the foreign 
tax credit. 
Another thing is that now we have created this system where we have 
thrown the GILTI and the territoriality of the one hundred percent DRD 
on top of the old system, the Subpart F. It is not clear to me why we care 
about base company sales or base company services anymore when those 
are a foreign issue rather than a U.S. issue—although, maybe they were a 
482 inbound/outbound issue originally. Additionally, I am not sure why 
they should continue to be in Subpart F and why they are not thrown into 
GILTI, especially, as Stephen says, when people, particularly the high-
taxed entities, are thinking it is very easy to go back into Subpart F. The 
planning the last ten years is to jump out of Subpart F. It is not too hard 
to go back in, especially for sales, and that to me seems somewhat of a 
concern. 
MS. ROLFES: Affirmative Subpart F planning would be irrelevant 
in a per-country system. 
PROF. COLON: Which we do not have. 
MR. SHAY: I want to mention at least two things. One is how the 
U.S. should think about taxes its taxpayers pay to foreign countries, which 
is a deeper question and not easily dealt with in the time we have 
available. I respectfully disagree, however, that the United States does not 
get welfare benefits from our taxpayers paying taxes in foreign countries. 
I do not think that is a zero-welfare situation. Some of the discussions we 
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have had formally present it that way. I do not think anybody believes that 
ultimately, but I do not know how much benefit we do get. In an inter-
connected world with migration and terrorism, I think that is an issue 
worth thinking more about. 
The same analysis goes to the question of, “Oh, why should we do 
anything about foreign-to-foreign?” I was interested to hear that it was 
not relevant to much of the analysis when you were doing the Obama 
minimum tax, but that raises the same policy issues. What those issues 
ultimately get to is: if we do not protect other countries’ taxes, they are 
not going to protect ours. It is driving us toward this unilateralist, every-
person-for-themselves approach to the world, and that is worthy of much 
deeper thought. 
Another question that came up earlier—and I am very concerned 
about the facile answers that have been given to this question over a long 
period of time—is: do we think this is an improvement over prior law? I 
would make two observations: 1) if you ignore the reduction in corporate 
tax rate, if the question is, “Do I think the international provisions are an 
improvement over prior law,” essentially, I am trading immense 
complexity for getting rid of the so-called “lockout.” Again, I am a bit of 
a dissenter. I never thought lockout was all that important, and even if we 
give it a five percent value as we were talking about earlier in the model 
that Rosanne was using at one point, the question is, “is it worth the 
transition?” 
So the question is not just, “is one better than the other?” It is, “is the 
new one worth adding to the transition cost of getting there?” 
Everything is going to be changed. Every model is going to be 
changed. Every accounting system will need to be adjusted. The cost of 
transition is very substantial. I do not think we are going to show that the 
benefits of getting rid of lockout are economically significant at all, and I 
think that will prove out over a couple of years. 
Having said all that, my second observation is that we have already 
spent much of the cost of transition. We cannot take back the mandatory 
tax. We cannot take back the cost that has already been spent. It is not a 
helpful question, “is it better than prior law,” without thinking about 
transition, but, frankly, that question is too late. That question has to be 
asked during the legislative process. 
Which brings me to what this bill was all about. I was at the Treasury 
in 1984 through 1986, working three years on the Tax Reform Act.312 This 
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bill was done in three months. The first text was introduced in October of 
2017; it was passed on December 22nd of the same year.313 It was all about 
one thing; having a tax act to show voters for the midterm elections. 
PROF. COLON: And donors. 
MR. SHAY: And donors, and now we are seeing that it is not having 
much of an impact electorally. This is an enormous squandering of 
national wealth for political objectives that are not even proving out. I 
think part of the lesson here is remember this for next time. Do not let this 
happen again. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: I have a question for Danielle. I am happy you 
mentioned the expense allocation importance. When you started talking 
about it, I thought you were going in one direction, but then you said 
something, and I have a question about that. We have, I think, three policy 
choices regarding exempt income: 1) allocate expenses to exempt income 
and disallow it, 2) allocate and allow, or 3) allow and allocate away. That 
is what current law is in general; it is Section 904(b)(4).314 We are 
allowing the deduction and allocating away expenses from exempt 
income for the foreign tax credit limitation. There is no express provision 
to disallow the expense. We have Section 265.315 That does not apply 
here, and that is a problem. 
Before the Act, the only exempt income we had, I think, was interest 
on municipal bonds. The DRDs we had were outside the scope of Section 
265. They were not about exempt income because their purpose was to 
prevent the United States from taxing the same corporate income twice, 
so the income was taxed. That was not a problem. Now we have Section 
245A,316 which is exempt income, and GILTI, which is fifty percent 
exempt effectively, and both are not subject to Section 265, and I think 
that is what you were saying before—that the Camp proposal considered 
five percent to be proxy for that with a participation exemption.317 What 
is happening today is we have a full participation exemption subject to 
GILTI. GILTI itself is fifty percent tax, fifty percent exempt, and my 
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question is: is that not the problem? Allocating and disallowing seems to 
me the most normatively correct option with which to proceed. 
MS. ROLFES: I think you have said a few different things. First is 
to separate between having a primary rule that says, “if a deduction is 
allocable to exempt income or to income that is taxed at a reduced rate, 
we are going to disallow the deduction or disallow part of the deduction,” 
and we have no such rule in the code to say that. That is your Section 265, 
and there is nothing like that. All that we have is foreign tax credit rules. 
The allocation of expenses to exempt income or to GILTI basket only 
becomes relevant if you are foreign tax credit limited. You are right to 
point out that I blew past the fact that there is a rule saying that you get to 
allocate expenses to the exempt portion.318 That is generally a taxpayer-
favorable rule because it takes deductions away from GILTI, where I am 
relying on a foreign tax credit basket. 
But that allocation of the deductions that are relevant to the exempt 
income is only relevant for foreign tax credits that are being claimed 
against GILTI and the branch-basket income because that is my high-
taxed income that is limited. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Because you do not have a Section 265— 
MS. ROLFES: Because we do not have a Section 265. The Obama 
proposal would have had the equivalent of Section 265, so it would have 
matched the treatment of deductions to the way we treat the income. Did 
I answer your question? 
PROF. SHAHEEN: Yes. So here is my question: is there any policy 
rationale for current law, for not doing— 
MS. ROLFES: For not having an allocation? There is—and I have 
had this debate on panels before—which is that other countries allow 
those deductions, in particular with respect to interest. Other countries 
allow the interest deductions that support CFCs. There are papers written 
saying that it is anticompetitive for the United States to be an outlier by 
denying those deductions, among others. 
MR. SHAY: That is just a subsidy, though, is it not? 
MS. ROLFES: I have had this conversation with taxpayers where I 
say, “That is a negative rate, so you are saying you need that subsidy?” 
They finally just come down to saying: “Yes, that is my argument. That 
is what I am asking for.” 
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That is the policy argument, though, that other countries are 
providing that subsidy, so we should match it. That argument in this world 
of the United States being an outlier seems like it is not relevant anymore. 
But that is the argument, that we should have that negative rate because 
other countries allow it. 
PROF. SHAHEEN: So that is the policy rationale for what is 
happening now? 
MS. ROLFES: I do not even know what they thought. 
PROF. COLON: What you are saying is that is the policy. 
MR. SHAY: Can I just read you the first sentence of Section 265? 
“Any amount otherwise allowable as a deduction which is allocable to 
one or more classes of income other than interest, wholly exempt from 
the taxes imposed by this Subtitle . . . no deduction should be allowed.”319 
The fact is the application of Section 265 to non-interest expense has been 
totally cut back by regulation. The issue that students who want to be 
provocative might think about is that we do not have to have the outcome 
we have in this legislation. It could be changed by regulation with respect 
to non-interest expense. That is the hypothesis. I am not stating that as a 
correct statement. I am saying that is a paper for somebody to write. 
Thank you. 
PROF. COLON: I think we would like to hear the final concluding 
remarks from Steven Dean of Brooklyn. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 319. 26 U.S.C. § 265(a)(1) (2012). 
2019]     THE FUTURE OF THE NEW 317 
INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
CLOSING REMARKS 
PROF. DEAN: I want to thank Fordham for sponsoring this event, 
Dean Sugin, Professor Kysar, and especially the Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law. I do not know what made you think tax 
would be a fun way to spend your afternoon, but I am glad you thought 
so. 
I am going to direct my remarks to the students in the room—
apologies to the folks who have thought deeply about the TCJA—
because, for all of you who have not spent decades thinking about tax law, 
I want to underscore that we are all excited here. We are not an excitable 
bunch, but we are excited, and I want to help you understand why what is 
happening now is a big deal. 
When you think about the rules that we have today, the treaties we 
have been fighting about—are they good, are they bad, are they 
indifferent?—all date, as we mentioned, from the early 20th century, by 
way of the League of Nations Covenant. The same team of 
internationalists who, before World War I, thought war was obsolete and 
who brought you Esperanto. 
My argument is that there is effectively, and has been for almost a 
century, a cross-border tax constitution. Very simple. It just says we are 
not going to double tax. That unwritten constitution grew out of the post-
World War I concerns that drove the creation of today’s tax treaties. It 
was not the adoption; these treaties were not adopted until after World 
War II, but there was broad consensus among experts that tax treaties 
were a good idea. There was agreement that double taxation posed a threat 
to cross border ties, and in the wake of World War I, such a threat was 
not to be taken lightly. 
Given how much has changed over the last century, it should not be 
too surprising that we find ourselves in—and this is why we are all so 
excited—what is referred to as a “constitutional moment.”320 I think we 
are redrawing the basic contours of international tax landscape. The 
trigger here was the financial crisis. Before the financial crisis and the 
austerity that followed, there were not many headlines—certainly not in 
the popular press—about international taxation. After the financial crisis 
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and the austerity that changed, it became commonplace, at least 
something about which you might talk. 
Now, we have a European Commission pointing out something new. 
Simply put, it is the controversial idea that what states do in the cross-
border tax context can create tax subsidies. Paired with tax rates around 
the globe, including in the United States finally, that are quite low, that 
focus on double non-taxation when the risk of double taxation has 
diminished creates the possibility of a profound shift. For a century, the 
focus fell on the threat of too much tax—but that may change. 
We are in a moment where the world—at least our small corner of 
it—may pivot. We had a heated discussion about whether tax treaties 
were harmful or not. That did not happen fifteen years ago. That was not 
a conversation. A small minority might have viewed treaties with 
skepticism, but treaties have never been the subject of widespread 
criticism. I want to emphasize this to the folks who are not tax specialists, 
I cannot tell you how mind-blowing it is that there is a real scholarly 
discourse about whether tax treaties are helpful. That is earth shattering. 
I do not know if I can convey that to all the folks out in the room. 
But while change is possible, it is not inevitable. Which brings us to 
the TCJA. When you have a constitutional moment, a moment when the 
basic contours of the consensus that we live with can change, there can 
emerge what some have referred to as a “conservative counter-
mobilization.”321 In a nutshell, this represents an effort to preserve the 
status quo. And the TCJA could be seen as an argument that: “Everything 
is pretty much okay. We just need to maybe make a few bureaucratic 
fixes. Maybe we will add a minimum tax or target certain abuses, and 
everything will basically be fine.” 
Amending a constitution, of course, is not easy. In this case, the 
conservative counter-mobilization may well win on the day. We may end 
up with very incremental changes to our basic framework. But, today, it 
is possible to imagine a world without tax treaties, which I assure you, 
would have been almost inconceivable just a few decades ago. 
I urge you all, even if you do not end up being tax lawyers—and we 
want you all to become tax lawyers—to keep an eye on this. I think you 
all, after spending a whole afternoon learning about the TCJA, are in a 
unique position to understand what is happening. Tell your friends! It is 
very exciting. 
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Thank you very much, and thanks to all the panelists. A really 
interesting afternoon, Rebecca. 
PROF. KYSAR: Thank you again everyone for coming. 
